Case Number: 2008-0702-F

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:
[Spain] [1]

Staff Office-Individual:
Speechwriting-Orzulak, Paul

Original OA/ID Number:
4022

Row: 48  Section: 6  Shelf: 9  Position: 2  Stack: v
**Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet**

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<th>DOCUMENT NO.</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
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<th>RESTRICTION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001. memo</td>
<td>To President Clinton from Samuel Berger. Subject: Communications plan for your trip to South Asia (9 pages)</td>
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<td>P5</td>
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<tr>
<td>002. fax</td>
<td>re: Personal real estate (1 page)</td>
<td>02/22/2000</td>
<td>Personal Misfile</td>
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<tr>
<td>003. briefing paper</td>
<td>Background Paper: MEPP: Spain’s Role (3 pages)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>P1/b(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>004. statement</td>
<td>Personal (Partial) (1 page)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>P6/b(6)</td>
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- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
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**FOLDER TITLE:**
- [Spain] [1]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
  - P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
  - C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor’s deed of gift.

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
  - b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Call
Georgetown
School
of
Foreign Service

66749
Sharon Heaphy Gill

Sharon H. Gill
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**RESTATEMENT CODES**

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TO: Paul Orgulich
ROOM: 308 DATE: 2/14
☐ Per Your Request
☐ FYI
Comments:

From: [Signature]

EOP LIBRARIANS--YOUR INFORMATION PARTNERS
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I guess it's now afternoon, so good afternoon, everybody. I am delighted to welcome to the Department of State Abel Juan Matutes, the Foreign Minister of Spain and a very good friend of mine. The Foreign Minister and I have developed a close working relationship over the past several years reflecting the increasingly close relationship between our two governments and nations.

Spain and the United States are linked by at least 508 years of history and, for some time now, Spanish has been this country's unofficial second language. But what is more important are the values that we share. Our two nations are linked by a cherished commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. So it's not surprising that, as we begin the 21st Century, Spain and the United States are global partners, and that Spain is playing a vital role on many international issues that are of the highest importance to the United States.

Javier Solana and other Spanish diplomats have taken a leading role in NATO and the European Union and have done a magnificent job of advancing the goals of a Europe whole and free and a stronger Euro-Atlantic alliance.

In Kosovo, Spanish pilots, police and soldiers have performed with bravery and skill. And in April, the Spanish Commander already in charge of EUROCORPS will take command of KFOR.

Today, Foreign Minister Matutes and I discussed the entry of the Freedom Party into the Austrian Government. We share serious concerns about that and about statements made by Freedom Party leaders concerning the Nazi era and other issues. The United States will react firmly and forcefully to any deviation by Austria from the democratic principles that underlie our partnership with Europe.

This morning, the Foreign Minister and I also discussed our common agenda in supporting democracy in Latin America, and I was pleased to hear President Aznar announce last week in Davos that Spain will sponsor a June meeting of contributors to Plan Colombia. The United States will of course attend.

In recent years, Spain has also demonstrated real leadership regarding human rights in Cuba. President Aznar's decision to meet with Cuban dissidents set the tone of November's Ibero-American summit in Havana. And I expect that starting this spring, Spain will play an equally important role as a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights.

In closing, let me say how much we are all looking forward to the visit of King Juan Carlos on February 23rd, and I will be honored to host a luncheon here in his honor.

Foreign Minister Matutes.
FOREIGN MINISTER MITJUTS: Good afternoon. I would very briefly like to thank my good friend, Madeleine, for her very kind words regarding my country and myself.

I would like to confirm everything that she said, telling you that I share her analysis. Spain is a good friend, a great friend and a strong ally -- a strong NATO ally -- and shares the desires for increasingly rich and privileged relations.

We've reviewed the international issues of the day. We agree on our views on those issues. We've also reviewed details for the upcoming visit within two weeks time of His Majesty Juan Carlos, the King of Spain, and his wife, Her Majesty Queen Sophia, this visit being one more proof of the excellent state of relations between our two countries.

QUESTION: Mr. Minister, your own country had authoritarian rule for decades with great disapproval by much of the West, most of the democracies, and yet it didn't shake it for a moment. Franco went on forever and ever. With that experience, is there anything that the US can do, and for Spain and other democratic nations can do to effect change in Austria for -- change for democracy, I mean, of course.

FOREIGN MINISTER MITJUTS: I would like to say that from the very outset I made it very clear to my colleague, Wolfgang Schuessel, our disfavor and opposition to the government that was about to be formed. Spain has a very clear and, indeed, a very active position on the subject.

Indeed, the President of the Spanish government, President Aznar, has gone along with the 14 other members of the European Union in signing the declaration by the president, the acting president for this period, Antonio Guterres of Portugal. And in connection with the European Committee of the Popular Party, President Aznar has proposed the suspension from the European Popular Party of the Austrian Popular Party until there is a rectification in this erroneous direction that that party has taken.

So you can see that Spain has taken a very determined position; not only will it not break the consensus of the 14, but has also pressed its own initiatives making clear its very clear position, hopefully facilitating a change in direction of the Popular Party of Austria.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, you spoke about the United States responding firmly and forcefully. Could you expand on that? What possible measures do you envisage if the Austrian coalition does not behave itself properly?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, let me say that we are deeply concerned about the Freedom Party's entry into the Austrian Government. There is clearly no place inside the governments who make up the Euro-Atlantic community in a healthy democracy for a party that does not clearly distance itself from the atrocities of the Nazi era and the politics of hate.

We have had excellent relations with a democratic Austria and regret that this development will necessarily affect our relations. I have spoken with President Klestil as well as with Mr. Schuessel and made clear that Austria must continue its commitment to pluralism and tolerance. And I believe that these conversations are, in fact, reflected in the preamble to the coalition agreement which talks about tolerance, respect for human rights, and condemns discriminations.
But, frankly, in all of this their actions will speak louder than words and, as a general matter, we will hold the Austrians to the spirit and letter of the preamble and we will follow the actions of the new government closely and will react decisively to any statements or actions which deviate from this preamble.

We have decided on these three immediate measures: We instructed in Vienna that our defense attaché not attend the ceremony with the new minister of defense; we have decided to limit our contact with the new government and will review whether further actions are necessary to advance our support for democratic values, I have asked our Ambassador, Kathryn Hall, to go and meet with Chancellor Schuessel, and she will convey directly to him our deep concerns. She will be coming back to Washington to report to me for further consultations and so that, upon her return to Austria, she can continue to convey our concerns about what their policies might be.

I have also asked Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Stu Eizenstat, in his role as the President's Special Representative for Holocaust Issues, to be in touch with appropriate officials to discuss how the new Austrian Government plans to handle unresolved issues from World War II.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, doesn't that contrast with the strength of the measures that are being taken by the European Union of freezing or possibly even expulsion or temporary suspension from the European Union? And does this contrast possibly, in any way, undercut the actions of the European Union? Perhaps also the Minister would want to comment.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, let me say that I do not believe that in any way it contrasts with what the European Union is doing. I have been in very close touch with members, various members of the European Union, and obviously their situation is quite different -- and perhaps Mr. Matutes wants to comment. They will continue through European Union institutions to have a variety of contacts, and we do not have the same relationship, obviously, as non-members of the EU.

So what we are doing is taking the steps that I have discussed. And I have also, I think, made quite clear that we will be reviewing all this on an ongoing basis and that we will be watching very carefully what they do. These are our initial steps in watching what is happening, but I believe that our position in no way -- we have a different relationship with Austria than the members of the European Union.

FOREIGN MINISTER MATUTES: You explained it concerning the Europe Union in a super way. I don't have anything to add.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, there are voices in this country who ask -- who go further and ask for the recall of the American ambassador, similar to the steps that Israel has taken. Is that in any consideration within your administration?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: As I have said, we have asked Ambassador Hall to come back for consultations so that we can convey this policy even more clearly, and we are continuing to review this.

Let me say that we are very concerned about, in general, something -- and Foreign Minister Matutes and I discussed this. But across Europe we have seen the rise of groups who tap into racist and xenophobic and extreme right-wing sentiment, and in many ways I think that the Internet with its web hate sites makes it easier for these
groups to feed upon each other and amplify their ideas beyond their small number of adherents.

And I think it is incumbent on all those who cherish democracy in this country, as well as in Europe, to do everything we can to speak out forcefully in terms of hateful language and xenophobic and extreme right-wing sentiments, and we will continue to do so.

Let me just say that I have been following this now for many hours and have been in touch with the Austrians and my fellow European colleagues on this, and we are very concerned. We are taking what I believe are appropriate initial steps. But let me just repeat: this is something that is under constant review, and we are going to be watching the actions of the Austrian Government and have, in fact, as I have said, decided to limit our contact.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, on a different subject, can you bring us up to date on the case of Andrei Babitskiy and whether or not there's any change in it since you left Russia and your discussions there?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, clearly when I was in Russia I raised this issue and expressed my concern to the Russian Government. We have been concerned about what we've heard this morning that is yet unconfirmed about some kind of a trade and are concerned about his welfare. Again, if such a trade has taken place, it's obviously not acceptable and we hold the Russians responsible for his well-being.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, in recent days Joerg Haider has tried to dispel some of the reports that he had made anti-immigration comments, pro-Nazi statements. Do you personally buy that his -- do you find his statements sincere? Do you believe it's possible for this leopard to change his spots? What kind of concerns do you have? Thank you.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I find his statements obviously unacceptable, and I think that whatever he is doing in terms of tapping into what I said was this kind of xenophobic and anti-immigration and anti-human rights policies is unacceptable. He is not a member of this government. And what Chancellor Schuessel told me is that they have looked very carefully at the members of the Freedom Party that they have taken into their government and, in fact, turned down some candidates as unacceptable.

But let me say, I am not going to make any excuses for Mr. Haider. I find what he has said repugnant, and I would hope that this would become increasingly clear that the Austrian Government itself, in terms of the way it deals with its policies and whether it lives up to this preamble and how it follows through on dealing with its past, I think that is what we're going to be looking for.

I have to say, and I will repeat, we have had excellent relations with a democratic Austria, and both Foreign Minister Matutes and I have worked with Wolfgang Schuessel as Foreign Minister on a whole host of issues that would show that his value system is one that we agree with. When Austria had the presidency of the EU, we worked very hard together on a whole host of issues on Kosovo. I've consulted with him on Bosnia, and I think that I have faith in Chancellor Schuessel. I am very concerned and disturbed by the formation of this coalition government, but we are watching it very closely and have taken the initial steps as I have described.
QUESTION: Speaking of democracy in Latin America, what are your thoughts about the recent events unfolding in Ecuador? And do you think these events can threaten the democracy in Latin America?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me say that we have been, obviously, very concerned about the events in Ecuador and we are in very close touch. We want constitutional methods to be followed and we hope very much that the new government is able to deal with some of the economic issues and are staying in close touch with them.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, could you define a little more clearly the US decision to limit diplomatic relations, as you said? Once Ambassador Hall comes back to Washington and has consultations with you, she will be heading back to Vienna, is that correct?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me repeat again that we have taken these initial steps. We are following this extremely closely. We are looking for actions, not just words, in terms of how they carry out their -- this preamble, as I said, is filled with the right kind of language.

We have to see whether they do follow through on some of their decisions to deal with their past, questions about the Holocaust and forced labor, which is why I asked Stu Eizenstat to become involved in this. And as I said, I'm taking this one step at a time and we have taken this decisive action. And Kathryn Hall will come here, we will consult, and the current plan is that she will return. But we will watch this very carefully.

[End of Document]
Kenneth Lieberthal is in California for 20-28 February inclusive. He can be reached (in case of war!) on skypager #8003151508. Jack Pritchard is Acting Senior Director of Asia during this period.
Your Majesties, members of the Spanish delegation, ladies and gentlemen: on behalf of the people of the United States, I am delighted to welcome the King and Queen of Spain back to America. A quarter century ago, the very first trip King Juan Carlos made overseas after his Proclamation as King was to the United States. Your majesty, we are so honored today that you decided to celebrate the 25th anniversary of that journey -- and the friendship between our two nations -- by making America your first trip overseas in a new century.

In the life of every democracy, there is one defining moment that stands above all the rest. It is Lech Walesa raising a fist in a Polish shipyard. It is young students with sledgehammers standing atop the Berlin Wall. It is Nelson Mandela taking the oath of office in South Africa.

Nineteen years ago today, the world witnessed one of those defining moments in Spain. In the early evening hours of February 23rd 1981, 200 armed militia in Madrid stormed the Parliament in a coup. They fired automatic weapons. They took every major elected figure in Spain hostage. It seemed certain that Spain's two-year-old experiment with democracy was over.

But when angry generals swarmed the royal palace and urged the King to join their rebellion, the King defiantly replied: “your coup will succeed over my dead body.” Instead, he rallied the people of Spain. He appealed to the military’s sense of honor. He stood strong. Less than 24 hours after it begin, the coup was over, its leaders were in jail, and democracy was saved.

Today, Spain stands as a shining example to all those nations who are working to shake off the shackles of the past and embrace free societies and free markets. It’s no surprise that our two nations are closer than they have ever been. For more than five centuries, we have shared a common history. Today, we share a cherished commitment to liberty, common commitment to creating a future of democracy, human rights, and political freedom for all the world.

In Kosovo, Spanish pilots, police, and soldiers have performed with great bravery and skill.
The Mortar of Monarchy in Spain

It could have been a Spanish tragedy; it turned out to be opera bouffe. A takeover of Parliament by the Civil Guard ended in less than a day with all captives safely released. 'The only thing that will happen,' said the colonel who led the attempted coup, 'is that I will have to pay with 30 or 40 years in prison.' It would be nice to forget the matter entirely and join with the freed members of Parliament in exclaiming, 'Long live democracy!'

Nice, but too simple. In truth, Spain's two-year-old democratic system was saved by the King and the regular army. Juan Carlos is an able, popular and democratic-minded monarch. However much some generals may long for a restoration of a Franco-style dictatorship, they remained loyal to crown and Constitution when their bemedaled King appealed on television for them to do so.

Their loyalty cannot be taken for granted. No Spaniard needs to be reminded that a three-year civil war exploded in 1936 when a unit of the same Civil Guard murdered the monarchist leader Jose Calvo Sotelo. He was the uncle, it happens, of Prime Minister-designate Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, who was trying to form a centrist government when the guardsmen struck Monday. And they were counting, vainly, it turned out, on the support of a hard-line general, Jaime Milans del Bosch, an unreconstructed apostle of the Franco dictatorship.

Spain has changed greatly since the civil war. An economic boom has transformed the social landscape, and the country is now poised for membership in the Common Market. Its church is no longer a conservative monolith and private political armies no longer wage open war. For the most part, Spain contends with the familiar ills of Western democracies: inflation (16 percent), unemployment (12 percent) and the surge in energy costs.

But there is an important exception. In the northern Basque provinces, violent separatists and the Civil Guard are engaged in bitter conflict. Each side accuses the other, credibly, of atrocities. The dispute has inflamed the worst in Spanish politics. With the resignation last month of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, Juan Carlos faced the first serious succession crisis since Franco's death in 1975. While members of Parliament wrangled, the Basque terrorism provided a pretext for Monday's assault on the Cortes.

The deed showed the world how fragile democracy remains on the Iberian Peninsula. This time, thanks to the mortar of monarchy, the center held.
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON
AND PRESIDENT ARPAD GONCZ OF HUNGARY
AT ARRIVAL CEREMONY

The South Grounds

9:45 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: President and Mrs. Goncz; ladies and gentlemen; in the early 1850s, the great Hungarian patriot Lajos Kossuth came to this country and to this house to seek support for restoring liberty to his nation. He said then, "To find the sunlight of freedom we must come to America." Kossuth would be proud today that his statement no longer holds -- that the sunlight of freedom shines in Hungary, and all across the world.

In the past year I have had the privilege to welcome to the White House extraordinary leaders who risked their lives in the struggle for liberty, were imprisoned for their beliefs and activism, and now have emerged in freedom's sunlight as the Presidents of their nations: Kim Dae Jung of South Korea; Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, Nelson Mandela of South Africa. Today, with freedom at last shining brightly in Hungary, I have the great honor and pleasure to welcome President Arpad Goncz, our friend, our partner, our ally.

Let me begin with a few words about our common enterprise in Kosovo. For 77 days we have been working to achieve a simple set of objectives there -- the return of refugees with safety and self-government; the withdrawal of all Serbian forces; the deployment of an international security force with NATO at its core. Last Thursday Serb authorities accepted a peace plan that embodies those conditions. Today, in Bonn, we took another important step forward -- the G-8 countries now have agreed to language of a United Nations Security Council resolution that will help us to realize these basic goals: peace with security for the people of Kosovo, and stability for the region as a whole.

The key now, as it has been from the beginning of this process, is implementation. A verifiable withdrawal of Serb forces will allow us to suspend the bombing and go forward with the plan. NATO is determined to bring the Kosovars home, to do so as an alliance acting together, and in a way that ultimately can strengthen the relationship between Russia and the West.

Our great writer, E.L. Doctorow, once said, "The devastating history of 20th century Europe, which you and I might study in a book or look at as tourists, is housed in the being of Arpad Goncz." In World War II, he fought in resistance and was wounded by Nazi fire. In 1956, he rose with fellow citizens against Stalinist oppression. And after Soviet tanks crushed the uprising, he was sentenced to life in prison.

Released after six years, he became a translator, bringing Western ideas to Hungary, and through his own plays and stories, challenged
Hungarians to think about the nature of tyranny and the meaning of freedom. After NATO's resolve and the courage of Central Europeans helped to bring down the Iron Curtain, the Hungarian people chose this great man to lead them.

Now, Hungary is one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe, with America its largest foreign investor. Hungary has acted to protect the rights of its own minority groups, and worked for the rights of ethnic Hungarians in other nations. Hungary has stood with the United States as a NATO ally against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and for a more positive future for all the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary is leading the way toward what people dreamed of throughout the long Cold War.

I am very proud of the alliance between our countries, the friendship between our people. I am grateful for the contributions of Hungarian Americans to the fabric of our present greatness and good fortune. And I am very honored to welcome here the President of Hungary. President Gengcz, welcome back to America and to the White House. (Applause.)

PRESIDENT GONCZ: Mr. President, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Vice President, and wife of the Vice President, Mrs. Gore; ladies and gentlemen, friends. I sincerely thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of greeting, which clearly reflect the exceptional confidence and warmth that your country has always shown to my homeland.

On the occasion of my official state visit to the United States, I consider it an honor to be able to share a few thoughts with you here, in front of the White House, perhaps the most gracious and eloquent heritage of American history and culture.

Mr. President, allow me to begin by citing something you said recently in San Francisco. The story of the 21st century can be quite a wonderful story, but we have to write the first chapter. It is the most significant even in my political career, and life as a Central European intellectual, that my country as an ally of the United States is now able to write that first chapter together with you.

We have a shared responsibility to ensure that the worldwide and irreversible victory of freedom and democracy doesn't remain merely a scenario. We must work together so that the actors in the story of the 21st century are able to live in prosperity and integrity, at peace with themselves and each other. Hungary is a responsible and reliable partner of the United States in this.

A membership of NATO means participation in defending the ideals and values which are indispensable for lasting international security, and which were reaffirmed by the leaders of the 19 member states at the Washington Summit. Hungary, which recently became a member of the NATO and shares a border with the Yugoslav crisis zone, fully shares the objectives of the Atlantic Alliance for peacemaking in Kosovo and agrees to the conditions set.

We are acting in accordance with our national interests and our obligations as allies in offering the greatest possible support to the international community acting for peace. We are urging a political, diplomatic settlement that will create lasting peaceful conditions among the nations of the Yugoslav region and one that will ensure democratic development of Yugoslavia.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me tell you that this very moment when we meet here is extraordinary. It had appeared for some time that we had to come very close to the end of the hardships and difficulties, and we can start building a future, lasting peace and
democracy, which cannot be complete without the reconciliation of the Serbs. But our hopes will never come true without Belgrade's clear commitment and verifiable measures, proving the seriousness of their intentions.

For a thousand years we have held the view that the fate and future of Hungary and Europe are indivisible. The key to the survival and development of the Hungarian people in the heart of the continent, in the Carpathian Basin, can only be inseparably bound to political and economic Europe.

Our negotiations on accession to the European Union are proceeding encouragingly. Our performance places us among the countries most eligible for integration, and we do our utmost to facilitate at the earliest date. I am certain that the successful accomplishment of this process will further increase your real confidence in Hungary, and that through our membership in the EU, we, ourself, will be able to promote cooperation between the United States and Europe.

Together with our consistent and, allow me to say, natural Western orientation, we are also rewarding special attention to balanced policy toward our neighbors, and contributing to strengthening European security with our active regional role. Through confidence-building steps, the promotion of economic cooperation and support for civil relations, we are also pursuing the goal that Hungary shouldn't be a border fortress of the unified Europe. Keeping in sight the fate of the close to 3 million Hungarians living in minority status in the neighboring countries, we extend many-sided support to our neighbors to bring them ever closer to the mainstream of Europe in development.

The prospective of NATO integration in the EU membership is the key to the future of them and the important security interests for Europe. The regional problems for American diplomacy and the personal initiatives taken by you, Mr. President, also served as a goal and we welcome and support them.

The present level and quality of Hungary and American relations is the result of an ongoing process of development which has been driven by shared principles and goals, and the mutual benefit of practical cooperation. It is especially encouraging to see that our relations also extend to new areas and regions which represent preparation to face the challenges of the future. We consider it of key importance and deepen the already successful cooperation, for example, in the field of the economy and trade. These successes have a beneficial influence on Hungary's development and also offer us a possibility of being closely associated with the American role in the region.

One of the most valuable of the countless links joining the two countries is the hundreds of thousands of Hungarians living here who have earned respect with their work and who have given support of inestimable value for the development of the Old Country.

Mr. President, on behalf of the Hungarian delegation, I thank you once again for your invitation, and for all the support of historical value which you, Mr. President, and all American friends of us have given my country in decisive years. I regard this day as a festive occasion for the allied Hungarian and American peoples, and I am deeply convinced it is an important chapter in our modern and dynamically developing relations.

Thank you. (Applause.)

END 10:00 A.M. EDT
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<th>DATE</th>
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<td>Background Paper: MEPP: Spain's Role (3 pages)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)

**OA/Box Number:** 4022

**FOLDER TITLE:**
- [Spain] [1]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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- b(8) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
Your Majesties, members of the Spanish delegation, ladies and gentlemen: on behalf of the people of the United States, I am delighted to welcome the King and Queen of Spain back to America. A quarter century ago, the very first trip King Juan Carlos made overseas after his Proclamation as King was to the United States. Your majesty, we are so honored today that you decided to celebrate the 25th anniversary of that journey -- and the friendship between our two nations -- by making America your first trip overseas in a new century.

In the life of every democracy, there is one defining moment that stands above all the rest. It is Lech Walesa raising a fist in a Polish ship yard. It is young students with sledgehammers standing atop the Berlin Wall. It is Nelson Mandela taking the oath of office in South Africa.

Nineteen years ago today, the world witnessed one of those defining moments in Spain. In the early evening hours of February 23rd 1981, 200 armed militia in Madrid stormed the Parliament in a coup. They fired automatic weapons. They took every major elected figure in Spain hostage. It seemed certain that Spain's two-year-old experiment with democracy was over.

But when angry generals swarmed the royal palace and urged the King to join their rebellion, the King defiantly replied: "your coup will succeed over my dead body." Instead, he rallied the people of Spain. He appealed to the military's sense of honor. He stood strong. Less than 24 hours after it begin, the coup was over, its leaders were in jail, and democracy was saved.

Today, Spain stands as a shining example to all those nations who are working to shake off the shackles of the past and embrace free societies and free markets. It's no surprise that our two nations are closer than they have ever been. For more than five centuries, we have shared a common history. Today, we share a cherished commitment to liberty, common commitment to creating a future of democracy, human rights, and political freedom for all the world.

In Kosovo, Spanish pilots, police, and soldiers have performed with great bravery and skill.
The vision and courage of the Spanish people have long inspired the nations of the world. Five hundred years ago, Spain led the world through the age of exploration. Today, Spain's vibrant example inspires those around the world who are working to release market forces and political freedoms from the shackles of the past. And few countries share as many rich cultural and historical ties to Spain as does America. Five centuries after Spain reached across the Atlantic to discover a new world, our two nations set sail today as partners in a new century, bound by a cherished commitment to democracy and human rights. May we be as heroic as the history that carried us and as proud as the nations that bore us as we work together to create a new golden age of freedom in the 21st Century.
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Five years ago, I welcomed them to the White House on the occasion of their son's graduation from my alma mater, Georgetown University. On that day, the King and Queen also received honorary doctorates. The King joked that the reason the University gave him the degree was that if his son started bragging about his Master's, he could say: yes, but I am a doctor.

Today, we meet on the anniversary of a special occasion, not just for our two nations, but for the cause of democracy itself. Nineteen years ago today,
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Speechwriting (Paul Orzulak)
OA/Box Number: 4022

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Today, we meet on the anniversary of a special occasion, not just for our two nations, but for the cause of democracy itself. Nineteen years ago today,
SOUTHWEST TERRITORY

Cherokee in the Tellico treaty, Oct. 27, 1805, was tentatively designated as the state capital.  
[James Phelan, History of Tennessee.]  
THOMAS ROBSON HAY

SOUTHWEST TERRITORY, the short title applied to the region set up in 1790 and officially denominated the "Territory of the United States; south of the River Ohio." It consisted in fact of only the future state of Tennessee, although in theory it also embraced the twelve-mile strip that South Carolina had ceded and, possibly, the Georgia western lands. Actual federal governance was applied only to Tennessee. The government of this territory was similar to that set up for the Northwest Territory, except that it was bound by certain conditions set by North Carolina in its cession of 1789. William Blount was appointed governor and superintendent of Indian affairs, and he served in this capacity for the entire life of the territory. When Tennessee became a state in 1796, the territorial government fell into abeyance, but it was essentially reinstated in 1798, when the Mississippi Territory was established.  
[F. L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893.]  
E. MERTON COULTER

SOVEREIGNS OF INDUSTRY, a cooperative movement active in the 1870's that was concerned with the distribution of the necessities of life. It grew out of the Patrons of Husbandry and at one time numbered 40,000 members. It maintained a number of cooperative stores, some of which followed the principles established by the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in England. At one time the Sovereigns of Industry absorbed some trade unions. The organization began to decline after 1875.  
[J. R. Commons and others, History of Labor in the United States.]  
CARL L. CANNON

SOVEREIGNTY, DOCTRINE OF, is a legal concept that attempts to explain the final location and source of political authority in the modern state. Sovereignty may be defined as that supreme authority which is externally independent and internally paramount (T. E. Holland), and a sovereign nation as a political community without a political superior (Abraham Lincoln). There are two aspects of sovereignty. One is de facto, subject to the test of its actual use as shown by the exercise of authority, and the other is de jure, or its legal justification. While the subject of much controversy among lawyers and political theorists, sovereignty on the one hand is usually considered to be indivisible. On the other hand, the administration or use of sovereign powers may be delegated to various subordinate administrative authorities. In accordance with this theory, sovereignty lies in the people of the United States, who have created a national government and delegated to it certain sovereign powers. But "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" (Amendment X of the U.S. Constitution). Therefore, the fifty American states are not sovereign, but are subject to the sovereignty of the people of the entire nation as such.  
[T. E. Holland, Jurisprudence; C. E. Merriam, American Political Theories.]  
WILLIAM STARR MYERS

SOW CASE, a lawsuit adjudicated in 1643–44 that became famous in Massachusetts history because of its far-reaching consequences. The case arose out of a controversy between a poor woman named Keayne and a well-to-do shopkeeper, Sherman, over the ownership of a sow. Lower courts decided in favor of Keayne, but Sherman, encouraged by popular sympathy, appealed to the General Court, or legislature. In that body, the majority of assistants, or magistrates, supported Keayne; the deputies supported Sherman. Although up to that time the assistants and deputies had sat in one body, the former claimed a negative voice on the actions of the latter. The assistants' attempt to exercise that negative in the sow case against the sympathies of the deputies brought the conflict to a crisis, the outcome of which was the division of the General Court into two houses.  
VIOLA F. BARNES

SPANISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Generally, the relations between the United States and Spain were marked by mutual antagonism until the end of the 19th century. The American colonists shared in the belief of the "Black Legend" about Spain, which portrayed it as a fanatical, bloodthirsty, and tyrannical power, and inherited the sense of rivalry between Protestant Britain and Catholic Spain, a rivalry that
was extended to the New World as Britain established
dominion over an area that Spain considered its mo-
opoly. When the American colonists sought in-
dependence, Spain was confronted with a dilemma.
While desirous of using the event to strike at England
and recover the substantial territories lost by the
Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Peace of Paris
(1763), Spain was anxious of the effect the American
Revolution would have on its colonies. Although
Spain declared war on England in 1779 after attempts
at peaceful mediation for the price of Gibraltar for it-
self had failed, it did not promptly recognize Ameri-
can independence; and even though it granted loans
and subsidies to the rebels, Spain’s military efforts
were principally aimed at recovering Florida and its
island possessions in the Mediterranean.

The issues between Spain and the new American
republic included the question of boundaries, rela-
tions with the border Indians, the right of navigation
of the Mississippi, and trade. To resolve these, the
Spanish envoy, Diego de Gardoqui, negotiated with
American Secretary of State John Jay. Although the
talks did not bear final fruit, they were responsible for
the inclusion in the Constitution of the clause requir-
ing a two-thirds majority of senators for treaty ratifi-
cation. Commissions sent to Spain for the purpose of
settling the outstanding issues were no more success-
ful. What changed the situation was the French Revo-
lation and its wars and Spain’s change of ally from
Britain to France. The desire of Spain to protect itself
better across the seas made it yield on the litigated
points, and news of the ratification on June 24, 1795,
of Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain increased the con-
ciliatory mood of the Spanish government. In Pinck-
ney’s Treaty (Oct. 27, 1795), also known as the
Treaty of San Lorenzo, Spain recognized the thirty-
first parallel as the boundary to the south, the free
navigation of the Mississippi by U.S. citizens, and
the privilege of deposit. The principle of neutral
rights was affirmed, and each side agreed to restrain
the Indians within their borders from attacking the terri-
ory of the other.

Pinckney’s Treaty and the fact that Louisiana Prov-
ince proved to be a heavy burden led to Spain’s re-
rocession of Louisiana to France by the Treaty of San
Ildefonso (Oct. 1, 1800). France then sold Louisiana
to the United States in 1803. Spain protested the le-
gality of the sale but had to yield to the fact. Soon the
purchase of Louisiana led to disputes between Spain
and the United States over boundaries. The United
States contended that the Rio Grande was the western
boundary, thus including Texas in the purchase, and
that the Perdido River was the eastern boundary, thus
including a sizable part of West Florida. Spain nat-
urally disputed both claims. The immediate aim of the
United States was the acquisition of the Floridas.
President Thomas Jefferson took the first step of in-
ducing Congress to pass the Mobile Act on Feb. 24,
1804. He then sent James Monroe as special plenipo-
tentary to assist Charles Pinckney in Madrid to se-
cure the outright recognition of the title of the United
States to West Florida and the cession of East Florida.
The United States would either renounce its pecuniary
claims against Spain or buy the Floridas directly. Jef-
ferson also intrigued with Napoleon I and Charles
Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord to put pressure on
Spain. None of these strategies availed, and con-
tinued Spanish spoliations on American neutral ship-
ing brought Spain and the United States close to war.

When Napoleon foisted his brother Joseph on the
Spanish throne in 1808 and a civil war erupted in the
peninsula, the United States suspended diplomatic
relations with Spain until a more stable government
was established. During this period Spanish authority
was gravely weakened in the New World. President
James Madison made use of a revolt in the Baton
Rouge district in 1810 to order the occupation of the
area up to the Perdido River, although American
forces actually stopped at the Pearl. The United States
also used the War of 1812 to seize Mobile, Ala. At
the end of the war (1815) a third of West Florida and
all of East Florida were still in Spanish hands; de-
mands for annexation were soon heard again.

Spanish appeals to save the Floridas, if not to re-
cover Louisiana, went unanswered by the European
powers, exhausted after the recent conflicts. Against
this background Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams and the Spanish minister, Luis de Onís, began
their talks on the Louisiana boundaries late in 1817. It
was not difficult to reach a quid pro quo understand-
ing: the United States would withdraw pecuniary
claims against Spain in exchange for the Floridas.
Gen. Andrew Jackson’s invasion of the Floridas in
1818, with the ostensible aim of wiping out the bases
of Indian raids into American territory, although an
affront to Spanish honor, emphasized the futility of
saving the Floridas. On the western side of Louisiana,
the boundary line was drawn largely along the west
banks of the Sainne, Red, and Arkansas rivers; thence
north to the forty-second parallel; and westward all
the way to the Pacific Ocean. Historians have aptly
renamed the Adams-Onis Treaty the Transcontinental
Treaty and consider it the most important diplomatic
achievement in U.S. history. Signed on Feb. 22,
1819, the treaty was not fully ratified until 1821, in part because of Spanish attempts to secure a pledge from the U.S. government not to assist the rebellious Latin-American colonies. The United States granted recognition to the new Latin-American republics in March 1822, and the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in December 1823. Actually, Spain’s hopes of subduing the revolutionary movements in its colonies were largely frustrated by British policy rather than the Monroe Doctrine, whose significance was not of the moment. Nor was its significance clear for the future, for during the American Civil War, Spain intervened in Santo Domingo and Peru.

Cuba was the next preoccupation of Spanish-American diplomacy. The desirability of acquiring Cuba, the “pearl of the Antilles,” became part of the idea of Manifest Destiny. Attempts to acquire Cuba by purchase or other means culminated in the sensational Ostend Manifesto of 1854. The Civil War diverted American attention from Cuba, but interest was rekindled during the Cuban wars of independence. There were two such insurrectionary wars in the second half of the 19th century. The first, in 1868–78, was the more prolonged and sanguinary, but it came at a time when Americans were weary after the Civil War and national attention was turned inward. President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration refused to grant belligerent status to the insurgents and acted circumspectly during the Virginibus incident. Had the national mood been otherwise, the Virginibus affair could easily have been converted into a casus belli. Spain declined the mediation of the United States and terminated the Cuban conflict with promises of wide-ranging reforms.

Fighting erupted anew in Cuba in 1895, in part because of difficulties arising from recent tariff changes in the United States. This time the United States was economically and psychologically prepared for pursuing an adventurous foreign policy. There were the vocal adherents of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s naval theories and of a new version of Manifest Destiny; and there was the influence of “yellow journalism,” particularly of the William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer newspapers, which prevailed over the antwar interests of business. Spain’s procrastination with the Cuban problem and the hardships caused by the militarily and strategically logical “reconcentration” policy introduced by the Spanish commander Gen. Valeriano Weyler provided grist for the interventionist mill. The last straws were the leak of the tactless contents of a private correspondence of the Spanish minister, Dupuy de Lôme (Feb. 9, 1898), and the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor on Feb. 15, 1898. In the United States blame for the Maine tragedy was widely attributed to Spain, although it is impossible to conceive that Spain would have intentionally caused it. President William McKinley submitted the Cuban question to Congress on Apr. 11, 1898, which, of course, given the prevailing American sentiment, meant war. Little attention was paid by Congress to the fact that the Spanish government had made most of the concessions demanded in the instructions from Washington to the American minister in Madrid. On Apr. 19 a joint declaration of Congress included the independence of Cuba as part of the ultimatum to Spain; when this was not accepted, Congress declared a state of war to have been in existence since Apr. 21.

The Spanish-American War was “short” in that it only lasted three months, but it was not “glorious,” inasmuch as it involved two very unequal powers. By the Treaty of Paris of Dec. 10, 1898, the United States obtained Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines and established a protectorate over Cuba. The loss of the remnants of the Spanish empire did not long embitter Spanish-American relations, for Spain had realized that the end was only a matter of time.

When the Spanish civil war broke out in 1936, the United States applied the new neutrality legislation, depriving the legitimate Spanish republican government of the right to purchase arms and ammunition. On Apr. 1, 1939, the United States recognized the regime of Francisco Franco. During World War II the Allies were able to keep wavering Spain neutral, which was of great value during the landings in North Africa. At the end of the war, the United States led in the effort to deny Spain’s admission to the United Nations and to recall the chiefs of diplomatic missions from Madrid, as well as to encourage the establishment of a democratic regime in Spain. In the thick of the cold war and at the time of the Truman Doctrine (1947), this attitude began to change but not enough to include Spain in either the Marshall Plan (1948) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). It took the outbreak of the Korean War (1950) to bring about a change, when questions of security overrode those of ideology. In November 1950 full diplomatic relations were resumed with Spain. More far-reaching was the signing of the Pact of Madrid on Sept. 26, 1953, which allowed the United States to build air and naval bases in Spain for ten years. In 1963, despite grave difficulties at reaching a new understanding, the agreement was renewed for another five years. Although the economic and military aid given
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. The sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on Feb. 15, 1898, provided a dramatic casus belli for the Spanish-American War, but underlying causes included U.S. economic interests ($50 million invested in Cuba; $100 million in annual trade, mostly sugar) as well as genuine humanitarian concern over long-continued Spanish misrule. Rebellion in Cuba had erupted violently in 1895, and although by 1897 a more liberal Spanish government had adopted a conciliatory attitude, U.S. public opinion, inflamed by strident “yellow journalism,” would not be placated by anything short of full independence for Cuba.

The Maine had been sent to Havana ostensibly on a courtesy visit but actually as protection for American citizens. A U.S. Navy court of inquiry concluded on Mar. 21 that the ship had been sunk by an external explosion. Madrid agreed to arbitrate the matter but would not promise independence for Cuba. On Apr. 11, President William McKinley asked Congress for authority to intervene. Congress, on Apr. 19, passed a joint resolution declaring Cuba independent, demanding the withdrawal of Spanish forces, directing the use of armed force to put the resolution into effect, and pledging that the United States would not annex Cuba. On Apr. 25 Congress declared that a state of war had existed since Apr. 21.

The North Atlantic Squadron, concentrated at Key West, Fla., was ordered on Apr. 22 to blockade Cuba. The squadron, commanded by Rear Adm. William T. Sampson, consisted of five modern battleships and two armored cruisers, after the Oregon completed its celebrated sixty-six-day run around Cape Horn and joined the squadron. The Spanish home fleet under Adm. Pascual Cervera had sortied from Cadiz on Apr. 8, and although he had only four cruisers and two destroyers, the approach of this “armada” provoked near panic along the U.S. East Coast, causing Sampson to detach a flying squadron under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley to intercept Cervera.

Spanish troop strength in Cuba totaled 150,000 regulars and 40,000 irregulars and volunteers. The Cuban insurgents numbered perhaps 50,000. Initial U.S. strategy was to blockade Cuba while the insurgents continued the fight against the Spanish, with the expectation of an eventual occupation of Cuba by an American army. At the war’s beginning, the strength of the U.S. Regular Army under Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles was only 26,000. The legality of using the National Guard, numbering something more than 100,000, for expeditionary service was questionable. Therefore, resort was made to the volunteer system used in the Mexican War and Civil War. The mobilization act of Apr. 22 provided for a wartime army of 125,000 volunteers (later raised to 200,000) and an increase in the regular army to 65,000. Thousands of volunteers and recruits converged on ill-prepared southern camps; there was a shortage of weapons, equipment, and supplies; and sanitary conditions and food were scandalous.

In the Western Pacific, Commodore George Dewey had been alerted by Acting Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to prepare his Asiatic Squadron for operations in the Philippines. On Apr. 27 Dewey sailed from Hong Kong with four light cruisers, two gunboats, and a revenue cutter—and, as a passenger, Emilio Aguinaldo, an exiled Filipino insurrectionist. Dewey entered Manila Bay in the early morning hours on May 1. Rear Adm. Patricio Montojo had one modern light cruiser and six small antiquated ships, a force so weak that he elected to fight at anchor under protection of Manila’s shore batteries. Dewey closed to 5,000 yards and shot Montojo’s squadron out of the water, but he had insufficient strength to land and capture Manila itself. Until U.S. Army forces could arrive, the Spanish garrison had to be kept occupied by Aguinaldo’s guerrilla operations.

In the Atlantic, Cervera managed to elude both Sampson and Schley and to slip into Santiago on Cuba’s southeast coast. Schley took station off Santiago on May 28 and was joined four days later by Sampson. To support these operations a marine battalion on June 10 seized nearby Guantánamo to serve as an advance base. Sampson, reluctant to enter the harbor because of mines and land batteries, asked for U.S. Army help. Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, at Tampa, Fla., received orders on May 31 to embark his V Corps. Despite poor facilities, he had 17,000 men, mostly regulars, ready to sail by June 14 and by
Santa Fe Talks Focus On Cultural, Commercial Ties

U.S. businesses could be on the verge of marketing more goods across the Atlantic in Spanish markets. Likewise for the cultural kin of New Mexico's Hispanic motherland.

That was one hope voiced on the eve of the fifth conference for the United States-Spain Council in Santa Fe on Friday.

The council, formed in 1996, is a group of several corporations and bank executives in both countries. Sixty institutions in the countries are members, including Philip Morris Co., Coca-Cola Co., Visa International, Microsoft Corp. and Lockheed Martin International.

Florida Sen. Bob Graham, who also is the current U.S. chairman for the group, opened the conference expressing hopes of increasing the cultural and economic relations between both counties. The senior Democrat praised Spain on its 20th anniversary of the "restoration of democracy."

"That event has not only contributed to an enormous revitalization of Spain (but) to every aspect of Spanish society," Graham said.

The current Spanish chairman of the group, Jaime Carvajal, talked about hoping to improve Spain's image in the United States. He also said he would like to see more cultural and technological exchanges between the two countries.

Carvajal also spoke about opening more trade possibilities for both counties with Latin America.

When asked how fostering economic development between the United States and Spain could help New Mexico, Graham spoke about cooperation through the private sector.

"We believe that working at the private-sector level can present a unique combination of cultural, economic assets for the Western Hemisphere," Graham said.

U.S. Ambassador to Spain Ed Romero talked about the economic support each
country has given the other throughout the years.

"The historical ties of Spain and the U.S. are just so visible and so strong," Romero, of Albuquerque, said. "I think what you have here is a picture of what the relationship should be between our county and Spain, and what it's going to be."

The conference, attended by Spanish Vice President Francisco Alvarez-Cascos and U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, was set to focus on increasing technology projects between the two countries, cultural partnerships and perceptions of Latin America from both sides of the Atlantic.

Romero's counterpart, Spanish Ambassador to the United States Antonio Oyarzabal, is also attending.

Santa Fe was chosen as the conference site because of work from Romero and Richardson, a past representative of the northern New Mexico congressional district.

Santa Fe is by far the smallest city to host the event. Past conference sites include Washington, D.C., and New York City, as well as Barcelona and Toledo, Spain.

The conference continues today and concludes Sunday with a matanza for government officials at Rancho Encantado.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: November 1, 1999
* Nation, natives sign pact to bury difficult past and begin a new relationship and friendship

New Mexico pueblo and Spanish leaders took a step toward reconciliation Saturday in an effort to bury their rancorous and sometimes bloody past.

Both sides agreed, for the first time, to an exchange program for teachers and students, which is designed to foster better relations between the pueblo tribes and their former conquerors.

"The most important thing is we want to re-establish the relationship between the pueblos and Spain, and this is a step in that direction," former San Juan Pueblo Gov. Earl Salazar said after the agreement was signed.

The Memorandum of Understanding was signed by pueblo governors, the Spanish Ministry of Culture, Spanish Vice President Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, the New Mexico Office of Indian Affairs and the Santa Fe Indian School.

Starting the next academic year, Spain will send teachers to New Mexico to teach Spanish to pueblo students. Once the students become fluent in the language, they will go to Spain to learn more about its history and culture.

"This is an idea we consider very important in this new chapter of our relationship," said Antonio de Oyarzabal, Spanish ambassador to the United States.

Under the program, Spanish students also will be coming to New Mexico to learn more about pueblo history, culture and heritage, de Oyarzabal said.

Good or bad, Salazar said, pueblo history is tied to Spain.

"We have a very strong history with them," he said. "We decided to renew the relationship and develop a relationship that has long-term interests for both sides."

Spain ruled New Mexico and much of the Southwest from the 1500s to 1821. Relations between the colonial leaders and pueblos were often difficult, even violent.
Salazar said Saturday's agreement was the first step toward forging more agreements, such as trade and commerce pacts, with Spain in the future.

De Oyarzabal said that Spain has recognized each individual pueblo as a sovereign nation and respects the pueblos' decision to deal directly with Spain and not through the U.S. government.

Spain also is willing to open old archives for the pueblos for the purposes of locating royal titles, old land grants and any other historic pueblo documents, he said.

Manuel Gullon y de Onate, a ninth-generation descendent of Don Juan Onate the Spaniard who founded Santa Fe and is responsible for killing several Acoma Pueblo members also stressed that both sides must put aside the past and move ahead.

"(Don Juan Onate) did some good and bad things. It's impossible to say he's a terrible man," de Onate said.

De Onate, who has real estate and telecommunication businesses in Madrid, Spain, said the agreement signed between the pueblos and the Spanish government is a step in the right direction.

"The history is (just) that and now we're all together. We really want to work together and improve our relationships," he said.

Meanwhile, Spanish Secretary of State Ramon de Miguel, at a luncheon of U.S.-Spanish Council at La Posada Hotel, told a gathering that the relationship has improved between Spain and the United States in the past 50 years.

"In 100 years we went full circle, from being enemies to friends, more than friends," de Miguel said.

Modern Spain, the secretary said, shares the same democratic ideals and free-market economy as the United States.

PHOTO BY: EDDIE MOORE/JOURNAL

PHOTO: Color

CULTURAL EXCHANGE: Spanish Vice President Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, center, with interpreter Jolyn Jeelof, right, talks with Isleta Pueblo Second Lt. Gov. Lawrence Lucero as other pueblo officials sign a memorandum of understanding Saturday during a ceremony at the Santa Fe Indian School.

PHOTO BY: EDDIE MOORE/JOURNAL

PHOTO: b/w

PRESENTING TO SPAIN: Claranita Williams, with the 44th Army Band of the New Mexico National Guard, leaves the Hilton Hotel in Santa Fe as media members crowd around Spanish Vice President Francisco Alvarez-Cascos on Saturday. The band was at the hotel for the Presentation of Flags at the U.S.-Spain Council.
Enyoy Hopes To Fortify Ties With Spain

Ed Romero, the U.S. ambassador to Spain and Andorra, said Tuesday that he hopes to strengthen the historical and commercial ties not only between Spain and the United States, but between Spain and New Mexico.

Romero, during his first visit home since his appointment in June, was honored at a reception at the Hilton Hotel.

Romero reminded the invitation-only crowd that New Mexico was under Spanish rule for longer than it has been part of the United States.

"We've had a long relationship, and we're going to start intensifying that relationship in November," he said.

That's when two New Mexico delegations, one sponsored by the Hispano Chamber of Commerce and the other by the state's Office of Cultural Affairs, will travel to Madrid for one week to try to establish cooperative agreements, he said.

The hope is that the agreements will lead to businesses and cultural groups exchanging merchandise, ideas and art.

Loretta Armenta, president of the Hispano Chamber of Commerce, said the trade mission will include representatives from the state's technological, chemical, retail and food industries.

They will be joined by representatives from the New Mexico Department of Tourism and the Office of Cultural Affairs, as well as artists, chefs and Native American dancers.

"We're working with several groups in Spain to matchmake people," Armenta said.

Before the groups leave, they'll attend seminars to learn more about Spain's culture and business practices, she said.

But Romero said relations between New Mexico and Spain will be easy to establish.
"Our cultures are very much alike," he said. "The only difference I've found is that the Spanish are more formal than we are, but once you get to know them the barriers come down very easily."

Tuesday's reception was sponsored by the Albuquerque Hispano Chamber of Commerce, Coca-Cola, the Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce, the Hispanic Culture Foundation and other groups.

While the crowd of about 400 munched on an eclectic menu of roast beef, ham, egg rolls, chicken shish kebabs and meatballs in chile con queso, Romero greeted dignitaries, including Sen. Pete Domenici, Albuquerque Mayor Jim Baca, State Democratic Party Chairman Fred Harris and gubernatorial candidate and former mayor Martin Chavez.

Romero said that in the years preceding his ambassadorship, he visited Spain more than 20 times as a tourist.

"I got to know Spain quite well as a visitor and a tourist," Romero said. "It's my favorite country outside of the U.S. But to know Spain as an ambassador is quite a bit nicer. In fact, if I had known being a government employee was this great, I would have become a fed a long time ago."

Romero is chairman of the Albuquerque-based Advanced Sciences Inc., an international environmental engineering and waste management corporation. He is a former chairman of the Bernalillo County Democratic Party.

He is a longtime resident of New Mexico and a native Spanish speaker, which he said has given him an edge in his new job.

"To be able to communicate in Spanish gives me a certain advantage that I otherwise wouldn't have," he said, adding that a speech he gave in Spain on July 4, in both English and Spanish, was particularly well received.

"The fact that I'm bilingual has been extremely helpful," he said. "I've had a very good reaction when I give addresses in Spanish, and that experience has convinced me that everyone should be bilingual."

PHOTO BY: AARON WILSON/JOURNAL

PHOTO: Color

HOMECOMING HUG: U.S. Ambassador to Spain Edward Romero, right, greets longtime friend Fabian Chavez during a reception for Romero Tuesday.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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LEVEL 1 - 161 OF 431 STORIES

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October 2, 1998, Friday,

SECTION: LOCAL; Ed. F; Pg. 66A

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HEADLINE: NOTABLE EVENTS OCCURRED IN 1977

BYLINE: Hispanic American Chronology and Chronology of Hispanic; American History.

BODY:
1977 was a busy year: * A group of young Cuban exiles called the Antonio Maceo Brigade (named after the general in Jose Marti's movement for Cuban independence from Spain in 1891) traveled to Cuba from the United States. The group performed community service projects in a bid to build a better relationship with the Cuban government.

* The Congressional Hispanic Caucus was founded by 12 members of the House and Senate who wanted to address concerns of Hispanic Americans. The caucus grew and now has representatives from 20 states, Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin islands. * President Carter successfully led an effort to revise the Panama Canal Treaty, which now requires the United States to turn over control of the canal to Panama in 2000.

NOTES:
People & Prime Time HISPANIC HERITAGE MONTH Part of a series in honor of Hispanic Heritage Month. The Rocky Mountain News is celebrating Hispanic Heritage month, Sept. 16 through Oct. 15, by highlighting the achievements of prominent Hispanic people and historic events.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: October 5, 1998
Reconciliation after 400 years: Pueblo leaders meet Spanish officials

by Carole Nez

San Juan Pueblo, New Mexico (NFIC)

Beneath an overcast sky, sixteen Pueblo governors met with Spanish officials to pray for reconciliation and friendship despite controversy over the 400 year anniversary of the arrival of Don Juan de Onate. The brutal treatment of Pueblo Indians is still fresh in the minds of people opposing the Cuartocentenario that many organizations and the state are celebrating this year.

"Today is a historic day for all of us to reflect upon the past and present, and chart a new course for the future of our children," said San Juan Pueblo Gov. Earl Salazar addressing Spanish delegates, pueblo officials and an audience of about 500 people.

In 1598, Onate established the first permanent settlement, near present day San Juan Pueblo. Four centuries after the conquest of northern New Mexico, Spain's Vice President Francisco Alvares-Cascos reiterated Spain's recognition of pueblo sovereignty dating back to 1622 during an afternoon ceremony called "reencuentro" or re-encounter of the Spanish and Indian cultures. Through an interpreter, he pledged a commitment of cooperation between Spanish and pueblo governments. Also, Alvares-Cascos invited pueblo leaders to visit Spain to continue the dialogue of exploring cooperative efforts in areas of education, technology, business development and health projects.

"It is in this future history - the one we need and want to write together that we will find reconciliation, fruit of a new will of two people who have learned to overcome the pain and the suffering of the past, two peoples who want to know each other better, who want to build a new friendship," Alvares-Cascos said.

A proclamation signed by pueblo governors states that Spanish colonization of New Mexico brought "great pain and suffering" but they were willing to start a process of reconciliation and "healing the people." Alvares-Cascos offered no apology but after the ceremony said, "What happens from this day on will be
different from what happened in the past."

In 1599, Don Juan de Onate and his soldiers killed hundreds of people from Acoma in retaliation for an attack on Onate's men. He ordered his men to cut off the right feet of 24 Acoma men after the Spaniards defeated the pueblo. Some people are critical of commemorating Don Juan de Onate's role in history.

In January, someone cut the right foot of a 12 foot statue of Don Juan de Onate outside the Onate Monument and Visitors Center in Alcalde, NM. The Albuquerque Journal North said it received an anonymous note that said the statue's foot had been cut off "on behalf of our brothers and sisters of Acoma Pueblo."

Wearing a pendant of a small foot in honor of the Acoma Pueblo men whose feet were amputated, Connie Bird, a San Juan Pueblo said, "This foot signifies that we still have feelings for these poor men. We pray for them every day for their sufferings. We did have conflict with the Spaniards but we have to forgive and forget and look forward to the future."

According to the tribal leader's statements, the ceremony was not an endorsement of the event that occurred 400 years ago but an acknowledgment of the merging of two cultures that benefited through art, agriculture, government and Catholicism. Three pueblo governors from Acoma, Zuni and Jemez pueblos were noticeably absent. Although the Acoma Governor wanted the Spanish delegates to visit Acoma, they did not, said Regis Pecos, executive director of the state's office of Indian Affairs.

"Today is the first step toward the process of healing the past," said Pecos. "It is a reminder in terms of the principles of respect and compassion that is the heart and core of Pueblo religion and philosophy. It is an effort to teach our children and be cognizant of the legacy that we want to give them."

Pecos said Vice-president Alvares-Cascos was impressed by the pueblo leaders' abilities to "dignify the dialogue and their courage to deal with all the complex issues that have caused many people to have mixed emotions about this event."

However, Ernie Lovato, former governor of Santo Domingo asked how the Spanish government who recognized the Pueblo's sovereignty might help them intervene with the United States government so their wishes can be respected, especially in the land claims area.

"The Indian Nations are constantly doing battle with the U.S. Congress," said Lovato. "Spain could play a key role in influencing the United States government by implementing policies. The United States Congress have to be reminded that Indian sovereignty existed long before the Federal Government. President Clinton and the members of Congress have to respect the wishes of our tribal governments because of our sovereignty."

But Alvares-Cascos said, "Spain will adhere strictly to principles that govern our relationship with other sovereign states - politically, legally and diplomatically speaking. We will fulfill our commitments in strict adherence to these principles."

In spite of the controversy, the Pueblo leaders gave Alvares-Cascos a pottery
jar that contained a copy of the proclamation and two ears of corn, symbolizing the planting of the seeds of friendship. In return, he gave the pueblo leaders small silver trays.

To the governor of San Juan Pueblo Alvare-Cascos gave a decorative silver penholder set. The gift was passed among San Juan Pueblo officials who blew lightly onto the present - a tradition that symbolizes breathing life and spirit into the gifts.

ETHNIC-GROUP: Native People

LANGUAGE: English

LOAD-DATE: August 26, 1998
Redford Township -- Don Pennell wants to honor Spain for its role in an American war.

The retired Michigan Bell executive may get his chance next year, more than 200 years after Spain gave rebels $6 million to fight an insurrection against the British.

The generosity, which would equate to hundreds of millions of dollars now, allowed a band of ragtag colonists to equip and train themselves for an eventual victory at Yorktown. Spain then declared war against Britain in June 1779.

Pennell, a former historian general of the Sons of the American Revolution (SAR), one of the nation's oldest historical groups, wants to award the SAR's highest medal of honor to King Juan Carlos I, Spain's current monarch.

But there are no guarantees the king will come for the award. Pennell has been negotiating directly with the king's staff and Spain's ambassador for an informal visit. The king was within weeks of a visit last year, but changed plans. He's saying that next year he may make time for a U.S. stopover.

Pennell is anxious to thank the monarch.

"Most people don't know we wouldn't have lasted six months (against the British) without help from Spain," said Pennell, 74, who also is the former director of the township's historic cemetery association. "The king understands that special relationship. His coming is only a question of when."

Pennell has worked to recognize not only Spain as contributors to the American cause for independence, but also the Netherlands. He has visited with Dutch ambassadors and members of that country's parliament to confer SAR plaques. The Netherlands supplied arms to the Americans, risking wrath from the British. The goods were paid for with Spain's money.

Pennell's entourage also has visited some German villages to hand out SAR
awards to the descendants of men such as Gen. Fredrich von Steuben, Gen. Johann de Kalb and the brothers Col. Christian and Lt. Col. Wilhelm von Forbach. The German soldiers turned untrained American farmers and merchants into fighters. German and Polish mercenary soldiers also made huge military contributions during the Revolutionary War.

Still, Pennell is particularly eager to thank Spain for its involvement in the American Revolution. Not only was it the first country to provide cash for the military effort, which it did secretly, but it was the first to recognize the fledging nation.

The Netherlands also contributed greatly to independence, although it paid in blood. The Caribbean Dutch island of St. Eustatius was used to store vast supplies of gunpowder, uniforms, cannon and ship masts for the Americans. It was plundered and destroyed by British warships around 1780.

The British admiral commanding the St. Eustatius raid lost 35 of the 40 cargo ships at sea during the return trip home. A hurricane got his fleet. Plundering St. Eustatius slowed a trip to blockade the Atlantic coastline, costing the British the war.

"Even the Lord was on our side," Pennell said.

GRAPHIC: Photo 1: Don Pennell, president of the Sons of the American Revolution, is trying to get Spanish King Juan Carlos I to come to the United States to receive a medal honoring his relatives' help in financing the American Revolution.

Photo 2: Pennell says Spain's king backed out of a recent trip, but hopes to stop in the United States next year. Photos by Morris Richardson / The Detroit News

LOAD-DATE: July 16, 1998
Question: How would you describe relations currently between the United States and Spain?

Answer: I think that they are very good in terms of the political relations of the personal relations between our top leaders. Just recently President and Mrs. Clinton spent five days in Spain. First two days with King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia in Majorca. Then came the summit in Madrid and then they all ended -- king, queen, crown prince, Mr. and Mrs. Clinton, Chelsea -- they all ended in Granada. The whole thing wound up gloriously with the dancing of the Macarena. So, I think this will give you an idea of how good the relationship is.

Q: What is your biggest challenge? translate this good moment into something more solid, more permanent. From the cultural point of view, we still have to recover the historic memory of the United States as a whole, especially the northern United States. There's little knowledge of what Spain and the other Latin American countries have done for the history of the country. We have to expand our cultural activities, present also the face of the modern Spain. We have quite a growing number of business people who are going to Florida and opening shop there. Unfortunately, this wave has not yet arrived in California. As an example, we have seven Spanish banks in Florida, we have seven Spanish banks in New York, yet not a single one has come to California. They don't realize the importance of Southern California not only in trade but also in technology.

Q: Spanish governments, going back 20 years or more, have taken pains to cultivate a rapport with Cuba. Might Spain also be able to serve as an intermediary between the United States government and the Castro regime?

A: Our aims -- the United States and Europe and Spain in particular -- are exactly the same. We want to arrive, the sooner the better, to a normalization of the situation (and return to democratic rule.) The question is, how to get there. We believe that by putting pressure on Castro we have achieved quite a lot. Whereas isolating Castro has only achieved one thing -- his reinforcement as a victim of the United States vis-a-vis his people. We want a quick evolution and we are putting permanent pressure on Castro.

Q: Has your approach changed now that you have a center-right government?
A: Our president has taken a tough attitude. He is still inviting Castro to attend the summits. Recently, Castro approved the opening of the Spanish cultural center that he had been denying for the last ten years. Because he wants a Spanish ambassador back as soon as possible, he has agreed.

Q: Do you think the furor in the world trading community over the Helms-Burton law has been contained?

A: It's a stumbling block between America and Europe at the moment when we should be closer and working together to the same aim of pushing Castro out of his present political status. From our point of view, this goes against international law. You cannot apply American law to companies that are outside the reach or outside the jurisdiction of the United States.

Q: Why does Spain have the biggest unemployment rate in the European Union?

A: Historical reasons, economical reasons. There are two ways of counting it with results of 15 percent or 19 percent. We believe that no country which has a feeling of prosperity, that is growing well, can have such a high unemployment rate for a long time. So, perhaps not everybody's telling the truth. It is going down fairly quickly. We think 300,000 new jobs will be created this year. Historically, people who left Spain and worked in Europe for many years have returned. The strong new element called "women at work" is something that did not exist in Spain before.

Q: Before 20 years ago?

A: Before 20 years ago: Another element is that we have been transforming our economy very quickly from a situation of state control, subsidies, to closing (outdated, labor-intensive) steel mills, shipyards, automobile factories and creating new, more efficient ones. That has produced a large number of excess workers.

Q: Have government restrictions concerning employee benefits and layoffs also created a disincentive to hire?

A: Yes, that has been the case for many years. About a year ago, a little miracle happened in Spain. Trade unions and employers got together without a division of the government and started to change these things. The workers have accepted a substantial reduction in fringe benefits and unemployment payments. So, whereas other countries have continued labor-management turmoil, we have been enjoying an extraordinary social peace. Now the economy is booming. The agreement is just one year old and it's working.

Q: Has Spain cast off its label as kind of a manana country?

A: Yes. This is one of the immediate effects that we noticed when our Common Market membership went into full effect. Now, we are in the same position as the most advanced economies in Europe. There are no more borders, no more protections so we have to face economic realities in the toughest way. This already has produced a total transformation of the Spanish economy. We were admitted as full members with a transitional period of ten years. We didn't even have to wait the ten years. So, for the last four or five years, we have
been fully integrated. The growth rate of Spain is higher than the rest of Europe. We've had negative things in certain sectors of the economy that needed overhaul anyway. We have received a lot of help from Brussels for our infrastructure, for our transformation of industries.

Q: Has the standard of living improved dramatically in the last few years?

A: Yes. The transformation of Spain as far as the individual is concerned has been absolutely spectacular. The two main initiatives of my professional colleagues when our generation took over was to force the entry of Spain into European Union and into NATO. They were both quite controversial. Well, events since have proven us right. The two main pillars of the Spanish stability you see today -- political, social and economic stability -- are the European Union and NATO.

Q: Now you seem to be seeking a more active role in NATO, especially in the Mediterranean command structure. How is that proceeding?

A: We are finalizing our integration into the military structure. All the technical problems have been solved except for one: The United Kingdom has said we would have to give up our present policies of putting restrictions on the use of Gibraltar. Our position is that we don't think NATO is the right forum. This is the last problem remaining for Spain's integration into the military structure of NATO. We still are very hopeful that we will be able to find a solution.

Q: What about expanding NATO eastward to include the former satellites of the Soviet Union? Good idea? Bad idea?

A: I think that today that is a position already taken and we have to live with it. As the last nation admitted... if these countries are European, if these countries are democratic, if these countries want to get into NATO and if NATO is ready to accept them, we have no right to oppose it. We will say that for us NATO has been extremely positive. Not only from the view of security but also from the transformation of our armed forces.

Q: What has it meant for Spain to have the NATO secretary-general?

A: Well, it is a extremely positive element. We are very proud of Javier Solana. His work has produced also a noticeably positive effect on the image of Spain in the United States. Especially in political and State Department circles.

Q: There are reports that members of the Basque separatists movement are in Mexico participating in kidnappings as a way to earn money to pursue whatever they want to do in Spain. Can you confirm those reports?

A: As far as Mexico is concerned, yes they are, we know who they are, we know where they are. Have they been active in terms of kidnapping? I couldn't tell you, I don't have any proof of it.
Q: Have any of them been arrested? Yes, they've been arrested and some of them were given political asylum status. But now, all that has been changed and we are claiming them back.

Q: Is Spain fully committed to Europe in the sense of seeing its future as fully integrated into all of the European structures including a common European currency?

A: Yes, we are fully committed and fully hopeful. We have to be because we have benefited so much from Europe.

Q: Do you see your trade relations with Latin America, or the future of your trade relations, as entering into a larger free trade relationship -- either with groups of Latin American countries or with the hemisphere in general?

A: Yes, absolutely. We think that we can all benefit from the disappearance of trade barriers in general. Every day we are more active in these Latin American countries in terms of investment, in terms of trade. I am absolutely convinced that a triangular joint venture would be very positive for the three parts -- meaning by that, Latin America, the United States and Europe including Spain.

Q: Spain endured a horrible civil war in the '30s. Has Spain fully recovered from the trauma?

A: Yes. Nobody in my generation or younger generations really thinks of the civil war but as a bad historic memory. I think the great divide between generations was the moment Franco died. My generation had to take perhaps the decisive steps of saying we are going to change the course.

Q: Will be the historical view in Spain of Francisco Franco?

A: Franco will be studied under many different lights. Perhaps it is too soon to say that we have an objective view of Franco. I say there were at least four or five different Frances during the 40 years. The man who won the civil war, the civil war that we have to agree was perhaps inevitable in terms that we were being taken over by communist forces. The Franco that well, kept Spain out of the war.

Q: World War II. of the war.

A: The '60s we'd say because in the '70s, the society that he had created turned, not against him, but at least tried to convince him that he was out of touch with the reality of a young country that was moving very fast. The last five years of Franco were disastrous and perhaps that was a blessing in disguise because when the man died very few people had the hope of keeping things as they were.
Q: And then you had a remarkable, almost miraculous in some ways, transformation. Very smooth, bloodless basically from dictatorship -- if you will, or at least authoritarianism -- to multi-party democracy.

A: When that happened my generation had to take the position of pushing aside all the concerns and all the fears of the elders who were insisting that we were heading again toward a disaster. We insisted that Spain belonged to a Europe that had developed all the democratic systems that were producing a peace and stability. We were the ones who said, Spain is not different, we should accept all the principles others have accepted.

GRAPHIC: 2 PHOTOS; 1. Oyarzabal began his career in Spain's Diplomatic Service in 1961. Since then, he has served in a wide range of posts including stints as Spain's ambassador to Ecuador, Denmark, Lithuania and Japan. He was interviewed Nov. 7 by members of The Union-Tribune's editorial board during a visit that included his address to the San Diego World Affairs Council. 2. Q & A: Common Market membership "already has produced a total transformation of the Spanish economy." Antonio de Oyarzabal, Spain's ambassador. (G-1)

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: November 19, 1997
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

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Since the beginning of the Space Age in 1957, the United States has pursued several general lines of space policy. National security organizations have found space capabilities extremely useful in carrying out their responsibilities, and there has been a steady increase in its military and intelligence uses. Meanwhile, from 1960, when the Eisenhower administration agreed to launch privately-developed communications satellites, to the initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s designed to foster private sector space activities, the government has acted as a partner in the commercialization of space. Civilian space activities have been the source of policy controversies since the mid-1950s. Successive administrations have had different views about U.S.-Soviet competition, ranging from a grudging acceptance of the reality of a space race by the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter administrations to acceptance of the rivalry as a central element of space policy by the Kennedy and Reagan administrations. Since the end of the Cold War, administrations have struggled to find a substitute for the space race as the central rationale for U.S. space policy. Enhanced international cooperation has emerged as an important element of a new U.S. space strategy, but by the mid-1990s, a fully articulated U.S. civilian space policy appropriate for the closing years of the twentieth century has yet to emerge.

JOHN M. LOGSDON

See also Cold War; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Russia and the Soviet Union; Sputnik I; Strategic Defense Initiative

FURTHER READING

SPAIN

Located in southwestern Europe, bordered by the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, Portugal, and France. It is the dominant nation on the Iberian Peninsula, one of Europe's great powers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and, until well into the nineteenth century, ruler of one of the world's great empires, encompassing much of the Americas. The relationship between the United States and Spain has been marked by three general attributes. First, the relationship is a long-standing one, going back to Spain's important role in the birth of the United States. Second, despite the fact that other nations, such as Great Britain, have had a more consistently high-profile relationship with the United States, Spain has been a part of many crucial episodes in U.S. history (independence, the late nineteenth-century move to global prominence, and the geostrategic calculations of the early Cold War). Third, despite Spain's recurrent importance in U.S. foreign relations, the two nations have never developed anything approaching a genuinely mutual friendship, each keeping the other at arm's length. In virtually every instance the relations between the two nations have been utilitarian in character, a series of diplomatic marriages of convenience.

Spain was involved in the American colonies' fight for independence almost from the beginning. In August 1776 the Spanish and French governments established a dummy corporation, Rodrique Hortalez and Company, whose purpose was to funnel military supplies to the rebellious colonies. Despite this early participation, Spanish involvement in U.S. independence was never a simple matter. Spain was far less enthusiastic about the success of the colonies than France. Spain's lack of enthusiasm was a result of a number of its own foreign policy concerns. It was eager to recover control of Gibraltar from Great Britain and was concerned that Great Britain might retaliate by supporting rebellion in the Spanish colonies. By the late eighteenth century the Spanish empire in North America and South America was grotesquely vulnerable. It was vulnerable not only to Spain's rivals (including Great Britain) but also to internal rebellion. Open support for the rebellious British colonies would put Spain in a precarious position. By its actions, it would help champion independence for a subjugated population, while still exerting control over millions.

Thus, neither of the two possible outcomes to the struggle between Great Britain and the colonies was particularly attractive for Spain. One possible outcome was a British victory, which would solidify British control over North America and place Great Britain in a position to challenge Spain's power in the Western Hemisphere. The second possible outcome involved a victory of the colonies over Great Britain, which was by no means an unalloyed advantage for Spain, because a victory by the colonies would be a victory for republicanism, an ideology incompatible with the history and predispositions of the ruling class in Madrid in the late eighteenth century. In addition, a colonial victory would simply replace one New World rival (Great Britain) with another (the United States)—not necessarily a better arrangement.

As a result, Spain was slow to side openly and significantly with the colonies in their struggle for independence. When a formal agreement to support the colonies
came (12 April 1779), it came via France with two particularly strict conditions. First, the Spanish laid claim to the territory between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi River. Second, Spain required that the hostilities not cease until it had recovered control of Gibraltar. All this amounted to arm's-length and highly cautious diplomacy. Spain's entry into the war to free the colonies was by way of an agreement with France, not the colonies, and even then only in a very limited manner.

The extent of Spain's reluctance to commit fully to the colonies was illustrated by its treatment of John Jay, the Continental Congress's envoy to Madrid. Jay arrived at his post in 1779 and represented the colonies for two and a half years. During that period Jay was spied upon, regularly snubbed, and in fact was never officially received by the Spanish government. Even after the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781, Spain withheld formal recognition of the United States, continuing to launder its support through France. The Treaty of Paris of 1783, by which Great Britain conceded independence to the United States, was a profound diplomatic trauma for Spain. The United States had pursued, and consummated, the peace agreement with Great Britain essentially independent of France and (particularly) Spain. While not an intentional sell-out, the agreement did leave Spain short of its primary European goal in the conflict (the recovery of Gibraltar). The treaty also gave the United States title to the Allegheny-Mississippi territory that Spain had hoped to control. Taken together these provisions set a tone and provided an agenda for future relations.

The period following U.S. independence was one of chronic, if low-level, crisis with Spain. Spain was a chief competitor to the United States in terms of territorial aspirations, and the rivalry focused on two specific areas. The first was the Mississippi River, specifically navigation rights for the United States. The peace agreement with Great Britain gave the United States control of what now is considered to be the Midwest. The profitable functioning of agriculture in this area required free access to the Mississippi, and the Spanish were hesitant to allow U.S. farmers free use of the river. In 1784 the Spanish government closed the river to U.S. commerce; negotiations during the period 1785–1786 failed to produce a solution and the matter festered.

The second territorial area of concern was the boundary between the United States and Spanish Florida. Both of these issues were not settled until a 1795 agreement granted the United States essentially free navigation on the Mississippi River and accepted U.S. claims on the location of the Florida border. Shortly thereafter, the Louisiana Purchase sealed the navigation issue, but Florida remained an irritant in U.S.-Spanish relations well into the nineteenth century. The issue came to a head during the winter of 1817. Responding to a series of incursions, forces under the command of General Andrew Jackson moved into Spanish Florida. The punitive expedition took on the air of a small-scale invasion, enraging the Spanish. Subsequent negotiations resulted in the Adams-Onís Treaty of 22 February 1819. The agreement provided for the transfer of Florida to the United States in exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. claims to Texas and the assumption of financial claims against Spain by U.S. citizens. The agreement was formalized on 22 February 1821.

With the Mississippi River and Florida questions settled, U.S.-Spanish relations became more indirect. For example, the United States began to recognize the independence of former Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere in the spring of 1822, reflecting both the reality of the dissolution of the Spanish New World empire and the general sentiment favoring such a dissolution within the United States. The dissolution of the Spanish empire seemed a necessary eventuality for the practical realization of the exclusivist aspirations of the young Republic. The Monroe Doctrine served as a warning to the European powers, particularly Spain, not to try and reverse the tidal wave of decolonization and, by doing so, challenge the future U.S. hegemony in the Hemisphere. By the end of the century, however, the United States and Spain again came into direct conflict, ultimately leading to war. The Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898 was far more complex and substantial than the brief period of open hostilities.

The War of 1898

Two important factors accounted for the outbreak of war. The first was the general move by the United States toward a place in the global balance of power. The nation's geographic, demographic, and economic stature gave it credentials for Great Power status and, in a variety of ways, it was experimenting with such a position. The chief arena for the expansion of U.S. influence was the Western Hemisphere. Excluding Great Britain's control over Canada, the major remaining European imperial power in the Western Hemisphere was Spain. Power politics alone suggested a potential conflict. The second factor involved Spanish policy toward Cuba. In 1895 anti-Spanish elements in Cuba rebelled against Madrid, and the following year the Spanish took vigorous measures against the revolt. While atrocities were committed by both sides, the Spanish atrocities were more widely reported in the U.S. press. The Spanish decision to counter the insurgency by the use of concentration camps led to the death of thousands and the fervent enmity of the U.S. public. That public (aided by a rabidly anti-Spanish press) sided with the rebels, effectively dehumanizing the Spanish and preparing the psychological basis for war.
U.S. president William McKinley was a determined opponent of war, but he was overwhelmed by events. On 15 February 1898 the U.S. battleship Maine exploded and sank in Havana's harbor and more than 250 U.S. sailors were killed. On 28 March a naval review board concluded that the explosion was of external origin, popularly assumed to be a Spanish mine. The Maine incident fueled the public's ardor for war. The United States issued an ultimatum to Spain on 27 March (to be met before noon on 20 April), requiring that the latter end the concentration camp strategy, accept an armistice with the Cuban insurgents, and recognize Cuban independence. On 9 April Spain partially accepted the U.S. demands, although it refused to budge on the question of Cuban independence. On 11 April President McKinley requested congressional authority to intervene with force in Cuba. The authorization included an explicit rejection of U.S. control of Cuba (the Teller Amendment). Spain took the lead, declaring war on the United States on 23 April. The United States responded two days later.

Despite its brevity (a cease-fire was ordered on 12 August), the 1898 war was a watershed event for both Spain and the United States. For Spain, it was the crushing end of global importance. The war stripped Spain of most of its remaining imperial holdings. The nation's geopolitical concerns contracted to an obsession with holding on to relatively useless territory in North Africa. Once a superpower, Spain by the early twentieth century was not even a major European power. For its part, the United States had embarked on the contrary path. It assumed formal control of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, with virtual control over Cuba. This aggrandizement framed the divisive debate over ratifying the 10 December 1898 peace agreement hammered out in Paris. The debate was about more than the treaty; the issue was between those who equated expansion and imperialism with geostrategic power, diplomatic prestige, and economic prosperity and those who opposed expansion and imperialism as mistakes of historical, geostrategic, and moral significance. U.S. insularity died on 6 February 1899 with the Senate's ratification (by a one-vote margin) of the treaty.

Following the conclusion of the war an era of bilateral disengagement began. Spain became an almost purely European power, of concern primarily to Great Britain and France. During the first thirty-five years of the twentieth century, the United States and Spain were relatively uninvolved with one another because they had little to talk about. This disengagement began to change in 1936. In the summer of that year, another in a series of power grabs by the Spanish military turned into a three-year civil war. The war was the defining political event for Spain in the twentieth century. The Spanish Civil War was, at base, a particularly Spanish event. To see the war as merely a dress-rehearsal for World War II, which it admittedly mirrored and pre-saged, is to miss the war's roots in the Spanish reality of the late 1930s. In addition, the Spanish Civil War had a significant international dimension. Spanish in origin, the conflict was fanned from outside as foreign powers positioned themselves to take advantage of the situation. The contending parties (the Loyalists and Nationalists) sought and received assistance from outside Spain. The Nationalist side was particularly successful, gaining decisive material and manpower support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

The government of Spain and the Loyalist forces were much less successful in obtaining outside support. The Western democracies, primarily Great Britain and France, feared support of the Republic would bring on a general European war and offered little help. The U.S. public was split on the war. Organized labor, mainline Protestants, the Jewish community, and the political left generally sided with the Republic and pressured President Franklin D. Roosevelt to support the elected government. The political right, the hierarchy of the Catholic church, and committed isolationists pressured the administration to withhold support from the elected government. Although official U.S. policy remained one of nonintervention, thousands of U.S. citizens traveled to Spain to fight on the Loyalist side, in what was called the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Those efforts notwithstanding, the Republic died on 1 April 1939. General Francisco Franco assumed the positions of president and generalissimo, which he held until his death in 1975.

Spain was destined to pay a price for its connection to and support of the defeated Axis powers in World War II. (Spain had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact on 26 March 1939, consulted with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, and sent troops to fight alongside the Nazis in Russia). The United States supported sanctions directed against Spain, albeit unenthusiastically. At the 1945 Potsdam summit, President Harry S. Truman charted a compromise course on Spain, positioning the United States between the harsh demands of the Soviet Union for intervention to remove Franco and the more benign stance of Winston Churchill, who rejected any intervention to remove Franco. Nevertheless, on 4 March 1946 the United States joined Great Britain and France in calling for General Franco's ouster as necessary for improved relations. On 1 June 1946 the United Nations branded Spain a threat to world peace. On 9 December the UN banned Spain from participation in that organization, broke diplomatic relations between the UN and Spain, and recommended that member states downgrade diplomatic relations with Spain. The United States supported and complied with these decisions.
The Cold War Years

Although the United States went along with Spain's ostracism, it also sought closer ties for geostrategic concerns. As early as 1947 Franco had floated the idea of a bilateral defense arrangement between Spain and the United States, an idea as politically unfeasible as was Spanish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after its formation in 1949. Prompted by a series of crises during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States began to construct a global security network to aid in the policy of containing the Soviet Union. As part of the U.S. response to perceived Soviet aggression, a place was found for Spain in the defense of the West.

During 1950 the ostracism of Spain began to erode (on 4 November the UN voted to void the resolutions that had condemned Spain, barred it from membership in the organization, and recommended the diplomatic boycott). The beginning of the end of the most punitive period of ostracism, which the UN vote signified, was intimately connected to a shift in the global geostrategic situation and, inevitably, a reshuffling of the post-World War II agenda in the West—particularly the United States. On the most basic level, continuing the political difficulties of the 1930s and 1940s was simply anachronistic. Beyond that, the Cold War redefined what was expedient. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Spanish split within the party was key, pitting as it did two Spanish right-wing coup attempts, declaring at first that it was an internal Spanish matter, fueled such opinions. Whatever form of government Spain decided on, it was agreed that the country should remain a part of the U.S. defense network. While Spain's value to the United States and the West had fluctuated over the years, it was still an important asset that the United States wanted to retain. If at all possible, Spain was to remain a part of the defense network via inclusion in NATO. The objective military value of such an inclusion was slight. The symbolic value of incorporating a newly democratic Spain into an alliance facing fundamental questions about its viability was enormous. For the United States the optimal scenario was a democratic Spain, center-right in that it would become a member of NATO and maintain a special connection with the United States.

By the early 1980s the United States almost had reached its foreign policy goals regarding Spain. Spanish democratization was a relatively swift and orderly process under the direction of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez (the constitution was ratified in December 1978). Suarez enjoyed the rock-solid backing of the Spanish king Juan Carlos, a grandson of the last serving Spanish monarch. On 3 July 1976 Juan Carlos, whose dedication to democratization was as firm as it was surprising, plucked Suarez from relative obscurity and placed the 44-year-old in the center of what was to be a defining era for Spain. The early years of the Spanish democracy were dominated by the center-right party (the UCD) headed by Suarez. For its part, the United States was generally satisfied with the UCD's tenure in government, particularly following Suarez's replacement by the far more pro-American Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo in January 1981. Spanish membership in NATO was more problematic.

Following Franco's demise the main impediment to NATO membership was no longer external, because most members of NATO were supportive of Spain's entry. The obstacle was internal. Spain had sought membership in NATO since at least 1957, and the ruling UCD had formally endorsed the idea during an October 1978 party congress. The Suarez government, however, made virtually no move toward securing membership. The reasons for this reticence are many, including the predominance of domestic affairs, a split within the UCD over the actual importance of membership, and the relative lack of pressure put on Spain by NATO members. The split within the party was key, pitting as it did two foreign policy camps against each other. The first camp, of which Suarez was a member, was content to leave Spanish foreign policy alone, to retain the status quo,
including nonmembership in NATO. The second camp, labeled the “Atlanticists,” saw the membership matter quite differently. For this group, membership in NATO (as well as in other intergovernmental organizations) served two more general purposes. First, membership would help ensure Spain in a web of democratic nations, a web that would help ensure the success of democracy in Spain. Second, membership would represent the external manifestation of Spain’s internal reform and modernization. Calvo Sotelo moved quickly for NATO membership, which came on 30 May 1982.

U.S. satisfaction with Spain’s move soon ebbed. On 22 October 1982 the UCD was swept from power by election and replaced by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). The PSOE was formally committed to withdrawing Spain from NATO (as well as drastically reducing the U.S.-Spanish security relationship). Opposition to membership in NATO had been a central issue in the 1982 campaign, and PSOE leader and new Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez seemed to be unalterably committed to withdrawal. While he had informal contact with the PSOE as early as 1975 (González met briefly with President Jimmy Carter in June 1980), he was not initially comfortable with the party in power and its foreign policy rhetoric. Upon assuming power in December 1982, González froze Spanish incorporation into NATO pending a referendum on the subject promised in the campaign.

Had the promised referendum been held in early 1983 there is little doubt that the outcome would have been a rejection of NATO membership and a defeat for the United States, but the referendum was delayed, in part through U.S. pressure. By the time it was finally held in December 1984, the socialists had made a 180-degree turn on the issue. Shrift opposition had been replaced by a firm commitment to remaining in the alliance. Continued membership in NATO was clearly tied to Spain’s admission to the EC, a goal that had been a central Spanish concern since at least February 1962; nations such as Great Britain and Germany made it clear that Spain’s withdrawal from NATO would damage Spain’s chances for EC membership. Another factor that led to the commitment to NATO membership was that the United States and other NATO members had threatened diplomatic and economic consequences. The ambitious plans that González held for the economic and technological modernization of Spain (bringing it into the global mainstream) required foreign capital and other international assistance. González knew that his own political future was tied to the success of such efforts. By the time the promised referendum on membership was held on 12 March 1986, the PSOE government and Prime Minister González had fought tirelessly and successfully for a pro-membership outcome.

U.S. relations with Spain since the 1986 referendum have been proper if not particularly close. With the end of the Cold War Spain’s importance as a military partner declined, and the United States began pursuing a policy of demilitarizing relations by downsizing its forces, a move welcomed by the PSOE government. As long as no contentious issues divide them, the United States and Spain should be able to maintain their diplomatic marriage of convenience well into the future.

SHELDON L. STANTON

See also Adams-Onís Treaty; American Revolution; Colonialism; Cuba; Florida; France; Franco, Francisco; Hearst; William Randolph; Jackson, Andrew; Jay, John; Louisiana Purchase; McKinley, William; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Philippines; Puerto Rico; Roosevelt, Theodore; Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War, 1898; Teller Amendment

FURTHER READING


SPANISH-AMERICAN-CUBAN-FILIPINO WAR, 1898

Popularly known as the Spanish-American War (21 April–12 August 1898), a war against Spain, with Cuban and Filipino participation, fought largely in Cuba and the Philippines. U.S. military forces destroyed two Spanish fleets and invaded the Spanish colonial territories of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, and Guam. As a result, the United States gained the Philippines and other Spanish possessions in the Pacific, Puerto Rico, and a protectorate over Cuba.

Cuba had long attracted U.S. interest. Its location, ninety miles from Florida and commanding the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, gave the island a strategic importance that grew as the United States became
13. Prior to Robinson’s election, she had always been outspoken on controversial issues, especially those relating to women and family matters. As a lawyer, she championed numerous progressive causes, often with considerable success. She twice failed to get elected to the Dáil as a Labour Party candidate.


26. These accounts are taken primarily from the *Irish Times* and the *Sunday Tribune*, between March 13 and 16, 1997.

27. Someone who is expert at stroking.

28. At time of writing, Minister Lowery, accused of considerable tax evasion, had resigned from Fine Gael but is expected to easily take his seat again as an independent in the coming election. The phenomenon of strokes and lack of accountability are relevant here.

29. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*.


37. During the course of interviewing the narrators for this project, one junior minister of state admitted to being warned several times by the police to leave Phoenix Park. The park is generally regarded as a place of male prostitution in the evenings.

38. These referendums refer to two very divisive times when the choice for divorce was defeated and an anti-abortioin clause was inserted into the Irish Constitution.


40. Eidelberg has found that successful campaigns often mean that voters’ expectations undergo a subtle change through a previously unexpected identification process between candidate and voter, see Eidelberg, *Politics as Symbolic Action*, chap. 1.


**“Overruled and Worn Down”: Truman Sends an Ambassador to Spain**

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Harry S. Truman answered the reporter’s question in the “plain-speaking” manner Americans had come to expect from him. It would “be a long, long time before there is an ambassador in Spain,” the president declared. The date was November 2, 1950. Seven weeks later, on December 27, the State Department announced that Stanton Griffis was the new American ambassador to Spain.

The tale of Truman’s about-face on sending an ambassador to Spain is a telling case of both the extent and limits of presidential power in foreign policy. It demonstrates how a president can find himself abandoning even deeply held personal convictions in the face of opposition to his policy. Ever since he became president in April 1945, Truman had been his administration’s most outspoken critic of the Spanish regime. He was never able to hide his contempt for Franco and routinely mentioned him in the same breath as Hitler and Mussolini. Another leader might have succumbed to the intense pressure for a change long before Truman did; instead, he repeatedly used his power as president to counter the trend toward closer relations with Franco Spain. But by the end of 1950, Truman was, in his own words, “overruled and worn down.”

The change in policy in no way reflected a change in Truman’s views. Long after he left office, he continued to berate Franco. Rather, forces within and without the administration combined to pressure Truman to adopt a new policy, which he found difficult to stomach. There were three distinct, though interrelated, factors that influenced American policy toward Spain: lobbying efforts, bureaucratic politics, and the international situation. Truman’s reversal in late 1950 was the result of the convergence of all three in such a way that he could no longer resist the accumulated weight of the forces arrayed against him.

The story has its origins in the postwar revulsion against the government of Francisco Franco. Many people still recalled that in the dark days of 1940-41, Franco’s policy had been decidedly pro-Axis. As the Americans for Democratic Action later reminded President Truman, “Franco, let it not be forgotten, is the man who once said: ‘What joy to see the German bombers one day punishing the insolence of the skyscrapers of New York.’” In 1946, memory of Spain’s wartime policy led the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to vote to recall ambassadors from Spain as a symbol of world disapproval of the Franco regime. As long as Franco ruled, Spain was to be a pariah.

The repeal of the UN resolution thus became the focus of Spanish diplomacy. Franco’s success in convincing the United States to support repeal and to restore full diplomatic relations with Spain was in part the culmination of years of effort in the United States by a group known as the Spain lobby. The Spain lobby was, in the words of...
Culbertson reported, "We belong now atmosphere, of it people unconditionally favored closer ties to Spain. The expectation of a Republican victory to For example, in March 1948, Representative O'Konski sponsored a successful resolution in the House of Representatives to include Spain in the Marshall Plan.

José Felix Lequerica led the attempts to improve relations with the United States. Lequerica was an audacious choice. Franco's most recent biographer has called Lequerica "the consummate cynic." During the war in occupied France, he had gained the reputation of "being more German than the Germans." In 1945, the United States had rejected him as the new Spanish ambassador because he was considered an unabashed fascist. In 1948, he recast himself as a lobbyist. No expense was spared in his efforts to improve Spain's image and expand its influence, and "large amounts of money were spent." Although it is difficult to evaluate precisely the impact of his lobbying efforts, Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted in 1950 that Lequerica's "activities, and particularly the lobbying in which he has engaged, have on occasion created great difficulties for the administration." 16

When Lequerica arrived in the United States in the spring of 1948 (ostensibly as the Spanish foreign service inspector), he hired the well-connected firm of Cummings, Stanley, Truitt and Cross to represent Spain. One of the partners in this high-powered law firm was Homer S. Cummings, who served for six years as FDR's first attorney general. Truitt was the son-in-law of senator, and soon to be vice president, Alben Barkley. As his main American lobbyist, Lequerica retained Charles Patrick Clark, who had served as an aide on Senator Truman's Senate investigating committee during the war. The Spanish government reportedly paid Clark a generous retainer of one hundred thousand dollars a year for his services.18

The bulk of the Spanish lobby was a bipartisan group of Americans who favored closer relations with Franco Spain. American Catholics were an important element. Church leaders were generally supportive of the Franco regime, none more so than the influential Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York. Among Catholic members of Congress, Representatives Alvin O'Konski (R-WI) and Eugene Keogh (D-NY) and Senators Pat McCarran (D-NV) and Joe McCarthy (R-WI) were among the most active congressional agitators for Franco. James Farley, formerly FDR's postmaster general and Democratic party power broker, and at the time an executive with Coca-Cola, was also active on behalf of Spain. Business leaders (notably southern cotton producers, bankers, and executives in the timber and steel industries) anxious to do business in Spain pushed for closer diplomatic and economic ties. Military leaders (particularly in the navy and air force) who wanted American bases in Spain worked hard within the executive branch to improve Franco's standing and used the press to get their views out in public during bureaucratic infighting. Last, anticommunists were attracted to Franco's record of early opposition to communism and used the Spain issue as a club against Truman on foreign policy.

Together, these people were a formidable and influential force. Although this article focuses on the issue of sending an ambassador to Madrid, the Spain lobby was active on several fronts, including arranging loans to Spain through private banks, pushing for U.S. air and naval bases in Spain, and, in particular, advocating U.S. government economic aid to Spain. For example, in March 1948, Representative O'Konski sponsored a successful resolution in the House of Representatives to include Spain in the Marshall Plan.
which left the Embassy “stymied in what we have been trying to do.” The disappointment in Spanish ruling circles at Truman’s surprise victory on November 2 was probably second only to that of the Republicans themselves.18

Truman’s triumph did not mean the end of the lobby’s efforts, of course. In the absence of a change in administration, it shifted its focus to bureaucratic infighting within the administration led by its supporters in the Pentagon. A post-election Central Intelligence Agency report betrayed the lack of agreement on Spain within the executive branch. It observed that Spain was “relatively unimportant to the US” economically while conceding that it was “of interest to US security strategically.” The report concluded that the Franco regime was not a good long-term investment strategically or economically due to its international isolation and economic weakness. The Department of the Army saw this argument as a threat to its desire for increased military cooperation with Spain and issued a strong dissent. The Army Intelligence Division argued that Franco’s government was “one of the most stable in Western Europe,” and it scored the report for failing to consider adequately the “potential strategic importance of Spain” and the “extremely serious” nature of the “present coolness of relations between Spain and the United States.” Citing plans for what would become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it argued that Western European “integration is incomplete and inadequate without Spain.” The Army even hinted that the United States might be better off with Spain than with some of its other, more difficult, European allies.19

While the Pentagon fought the internal fight, the external pressure on the administration from the Spain lobby also continued. The revived campaign clearly annoyed Truman. At a morning staff meeting on May 6, 1949, Truman noted that he had recently received a letter from Farley on the subject of sending an ambassador to Spain. The president’s temper flared. He lashed out at Senator McCarran, with whom he had been at odds for years, dating back to a 1938 dispute in the Senate.20 McCarran, who predated and was second only to Joe McCarthy as an anticomunist red-baiter, “had gone to Secretary of State Acheson and threatened him with the loss of State Department appropriations unless an ambassador is named.” Truman remarked acridly, “I think . . . McCarran has been reached.” He remained resolute, however. Noting that “Franco was as bad a dictator as Mussolini or Hitler,” Truman declared that he “did not care if Cardinal Spellman and the Pope” wanted an American ambassador in Madrid. He also noted the pressure coming from Coca-Cola (Farley’s employer) and Chase National Bank but expressed little sympathy for their desire to protect their investments in Spain.21

With Truman remaining obstinate, the focus shifted to Congress. The Spain lobby’s campaign there focused on three major themes: anticomunism, Catholicism, and cotton.22 In the Senate, McCarran began the offensive on May 10, attacking the administration for not pushing for the repeal of the UN resolution. He also hinted that his personal support for NATO, which was about to be considered by the Senate, might be contingent on Spanish membership. “If Spain is ready to join the Atlantic Pact,” McCarran said, “why should we give the cold shoulder to a great people and a great nation and a great government . . . when the United States is reaching out for everything that will protect us?” Senator Owen Brewster (R-ME) also made an anticomunist appeal, using the deteriorating situation in China as a cautionary tale. “Is it not a rather curious and deadly parallel,” he asked, “that the very same influences which led us down the path of destruction in the Chinese affair . . . are the very same forces which say we must have nothing to do with Franco Spain?”23 Brewster was clearly suggesting that the administration’s position on Spain was the work of communist sympathizers in government, those who had “lost” China.

McCarran also injected religion into the debate. The Catholic Church hierarchy had long been supportive of Franco due to the actions of some Spanish Republicans against the Church before and during the Spanish Civil War. McCarran insinuated, all the while denying that he was doing so, that the administration’s stand against Franco was rooted in anti-Catholicism. He observed that the Army Intelligence Division argued that “Spain is a Catholic country.”24 Senator Brewster charged that the members of the U.S. delegation to the UN who were “most earnest in their opposition to the recognition of Spain” felt that way “because, forsooth, Spain is a Catholic country.”25

Having cast doubts on the motives of the administration, McCarran moved on to the economic front. He argued in favor of U.S. loans for Franco and criticized Acheson’s claim that Spain’s credit was not good. He observed that the British government considered Spanish credit good enough to support $450 million in bilateral trade, much of it in Egyptian cotton.26 Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-NE) estimated that U.S. cotton producers had lost the sale of three hundred thousand bales of cotton over three years because of American political opposition to Franco, and Senator Burnet Maybank (D-SC) joined the chorus of voices calling for cotton credits for Spain. Perhaps the biggest catch for the Spain lobby was Senator Tom Connally (D-TX), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee. The administration relied on Connally to lead its foreign policy initiatives through the Senate and could not afford to ignore his views. On May 10, Connally invited a number of business leaders to a luncheon with other senators interested in the possibility of resuming a more normal trade relationship with Spain.27 On that same day, Connally joined Senators McCarran and Brewster in calling for the return of an ambassador to Madrid and made a point of noting the difficulty that Texas cotton producers were having in finding export markets.28

This flurry of activity briefly stirred the diminishing opposition to Franco. The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee protested outside the Spanish consulate in New York, shouting “No alliance with Fascist Spain.”29 Senator Glen Taylor (D-ID), Henry Wallace’s fervently liberal running mate on the 1948 Progressive Party ticket, called Franco “a menace to the world” who was being propped up by “big business interests, the cold war State Department officials, and the ranking military men in our armed forces.”30 Despite the rhetorical resurrection of the old-time anti-Fascist religion, its intensity had clearly waned. In New York, which once had been a hotbed of anti-Franco activism, rallies drew crowds numbering only in the hundreds, while less than four years earlier, similar events brought sixteen thousand people to Madison Square Garden.

Postwar developments, combined with the intense efforts of the Spanish lobby, had begun to turn the tide of popular opinion toward an acceptance of Franco. During the Spanish Civil War, the American public had been strongly against Franco. A February 1938 Gallup poll showed 75 percent supported the Loyalists as opposed to Franco. Franco’s support for the Axis in the war did nothing to improve his image in the United
States. At the end of the war, in August 1945, 76 percent opposed Spanish membership in the UN. Spain's Civil War was still widely perceived as the first battle of World War II, and the Western refusal to aid the Loyalists in the face of Axis assistance to Franco was seen as an example of the failed policy of appeasement.

With the advent of the cold war, that view began to change. Due to Soviet support for the Loyalists, the Spanish Civil War was seen increasingly as the first battle against international communism. Rather than a fascist puppet, Franco was now portrayed by his supporters as a precursor of anticommunism. A Gallup poll conducted in April 1949 showed that 58 percent of the American people could correctly identify Franco. That group was evenly divided on the question of Spain in NATO: 23 percent favored Spain in NATO, 23 percent opposed membership, and 12 percent had no opinion. It is reasonable to assume that those favoring Spanish participation in NATO also favored full diplomatic relations with Spain and that strong opposition to closer ties with Spain was diminishing.

While the arguments of the Spain lobby were making headway in Congress and among the public generally, the president remained unconvinced. More than anyone, Truman still thought of Franco in terms of World War II. He saw Franco as the product of fascist intervention in the Spanish Civil War; he remembered the pro-Axis propaganda that emanated from Madrid in the early years of the war when an Allied victory seemed unlikely. As a Protestant and a Mason, Truman was naturally outraged by reports that these groups suffered persecution in Spain, and these charges only reinforced his often-stated belief that Franco was no better than Hitler or Mussolini.

The views of Dean Acheson, who became secretary of state in January 1949, are somewhat harder to read. Acheson is best known as one of the main architects of the policy of containment, but like his chief, his attitudes toward Spain were influenced by pre-cold war experience. As assistant secretary of state for economic affairs during the Second World War, Acheson was continually frustrated by Spain's policy of playing the Allies and Axis off against each other to Spanish economic benefit. Additionally, Germany's experience with Franco left Acheson dubious of Spain's value as an ally in the cold war. Hitler was frustrated throughout the war by Franco's insistence that Spain receive large amounts of military and economic aid before it could be of any military assistance to Germany's war effort. Acheson expected Franco to play similar games with the United States in the event of a war with the Soviets.

Unlike Truman's more visceral revulsion, Acheson's distaste for the Spanish dictator bears the mark of a patrician aversion to associating with an unseemly character. He seems to have taken a more practical approach to the problem, trying to maintain some distance from Franco to satisfy the moral principles of his boss while moderating policy just enough to placate the Spain lobby. Whatever Acheson's personal views, in light of his chief's strong feelings on the subject, he had little choice but to take a fairly hard line against Franco in public. Thus, on May 11, 1949, Acheson made his first extended statement on Spain to clarify U.S. policy in light of press reports on the internal administration debate.

Acheson began by tracing the history of the UN resolution and admitting that it had failed in its purpose, that is, to bring about reform in Spain. But Acheson argued that the issue was nonetheless important because it was a "symbol" of the disapproval of the fascist nature of the regime. In particular, Acheson listed the basic human rights that were denied in Spain: habeas corpus, trial by jury, religious liberty, and freedom of association. Although the American goal was to "bring Spain back into the family of nations," Acheson concluded that this was impossible without "some move to liberalize .... You cannot have an intimate working relationship with such a regime in the economic field and in the defense field." This policy, Acheson admitted, was bound to be unpopular, since it "is one calculated to please neither group of extremists in the United States."

Acheson's prediction was accurate. In the midst of the growing anticommunist fervor, the secretary's refusal to accept Franco's anticommunist regime as an ally immediately prompted Senator Harry Cain (R-WA) to charge that the administration was "concerned with civil liberties only when that concern coincides with the current Communist Party line, but not when it concerns the security and defense of the United States." Senator Brewster blamed American policy on a "curious influence [which] comes directly from Moscow." Some congressional opponents of Franco, like Jacob Javits and Helen Gahagan Douglas, defended Acheson. The secretary's opponents were more numerous, however. One mockingly asked what kind of a symbol it was when the United States sent ambassadors to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other iron curtain countries that also lacked fundamental civil liberties. Even the American chargé d'affaires in Madrid, Paul Culbertson, opposed Acheson's statement. He argued that U.S. policy could not be based on "the concept of molding the rest of the world in our own democratic image" but should rest on "sound and not emotional reason." Acheson was the president of the United States. As long as Truman's policy was ruled by his emotions and moral principles, there was little Acheson could do.

Despite his attempt to make it appear that the administration was above politics and thus unconcerned that its policy would be unpopular with extremists, Acheson was clearly trying to find a tenable political middle ground. The question of sending an ambassador was ultimately a presidential decision, but the criticism in Congress was putting pressure on the administration to abandon the UN resolution. The efforts of the Spain lobby were having an effect in Congress and within the administration, but the president remained adamant in his opposition to any change in policy that implied approval of Franco. By tying the American position on the UN resolution to internal reform in Spain, Acheson hoped to either encourage such change (which would satisfy Truman and lead to repeal of the resolution) or to justify a continuation of the policy with an appeal to democratic principle.

In the fall of 1949, it became increasingly apparent that President Truman, even within his own administration, was almost alone in his strong opposition to Franco. As early as 1947, the State Department had concluded that the UN resolution was a failure and should be abandoned. Truman's strong opposition prevented the administration from openly acting on that conclusion. Despite the president's aversion to Franco, the navy demonstrated its interest in Spain by calling on Spanish ports in September 1949; a veritable parade of senators and representatives made pilgrimages to Madrid throughout the fall and came back with words of praise for Franco. Truman denied that there was any political significance to the navy visits and strongly stated that no member of Congress,
in particular Senator McCarran, could negotiate with Franco on behalf of the United States. But these events, coming in the context of the Soviet explosion of an atomic device and the triumph of the Communist Party in China, were inevitably seen by both foreign and domestic observers as indicating a change in American policy. Paul Colbyteston wrote Acheson of his "regret about the forthcoming visit of a United States naval squadron and members of the Senate appropriations Committee since the Spanish would ‘read into them real political significance.’" Such trips in his estimation retarded "any consideration which Franco may have been giving to modernization or change in his regime."39

By late November 1949, even Acheson had changed his tune. A State Department study concluded that the political benefits of a changed policy would far outweigh the liabilities. Observing that "the general public is not greatly interested in our relations with Spain," the paper added that the repeal of the UN resolution "would probably be accepted by the preponderance of politically effective opinion in the United States." This paper also proposed a major shift in American policy, one that repudiated Acheson's May 11 statement on human rights in Spain and abandoned the tactic of pushing for Spanish reform.40

The same day this report was issued, November 21, Acheson met with the president to discuss the perennial problem of Spain and the UN and convince him that the time had come for a change. Acheson told Truman that other nations might take the lead in repealing the 1946 resolution and asked what course the United States would then take. "After a thorough discussion of the matter," Acheson wrote, "the President concluded that, although it would be most distasteful to him to vote for the repeal of the resolution, nevertheless he believed on the whole it was the wisest course." Truman insisted, however, that the U.S. delegation not "propose it or agitate it." Acheson had nudged the president toward a change in policy at last.41

Or so it seemed. In fact, Truman's conversion was amazingly short-lived. Only a month later, Truman returned to his earlier opposition. All it took was a conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt, a long-time Franco foe. Fortified by Roosevelt's support, Truman also asked his aide Clark Clifford to study the statement and offer his suggestions. Clifford offered strong support for the statement in general while attempting to temper Truman's fixation on the religious issue. He suggested that Truman's addition be excised and the words religious freedom added to a list of developments for which the United States hoped. Clifford also suggested the omission of two other sections, which he considered "gratuitous" insults to both the opposition and the Franco government. Not surprisingly, Truman agreed to omit the criticism of the opposition and insisted on including the offending passage about Franco.42

While waiting for Truman's final approval, Acheson went ahead with preparations to launch the new policy. He used an appearance at an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to test the statement on congressional leaders. Without a clear go-ahead from Truman, Acheson had to hold back somewhat. He called the UN policy of withdrawal of ambassadors "as powerful as a pop gun . . . of absolutely no use in trying to affect the internal operations of a government" and suggested that "the best thing to do [may be] just to face this [and] get out of the ridiculous position." But he refrained from stating unequivocally that the United States would do so.43

Acheson's testimony also revealed his strategy behind this revision of Spanish policy. The most vulnerable aspect of American policy was its continued support of the 1946 UN resolution, which had clearly failed. Acheson hoped to defuse the strength of the Spain lobby by conceding this point while stating even more strongly that the administration remained resolutely opposed to any special economic or military relationship with Franco. All he was advocating was that the U.S. reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Spain by sending an ambassador to Madrid: "We can have perfectly ordinary relations with it and deal with it at arms length."44 He was still opposed to including Spain in the Marshall Plan or extending other economic aid to Spain. He did not envision incorporating Spain into NATO or establishing American military bases in Spain. Acheson understood that for the Spain lobby, an American ambassador in Madrid was merely the first step toward increasingly cordial economic relations and a military

On Spain, Acheson ran straight into the stone wall of Truman's convictions. Seeing support for Truman's policy dwindling both at home and overseas, the secretary set out to scale that wall. Acheson had come to believe that the American position was increasingly counterproductive. The UN resolution had been ineffective and held no prospect of dislodging Franco. By continuing to support a policy that it admitted had failed, the administration opened itself to embarrassing criticism, particularly from conservatives who charged that the administration's opposition to Franco (long the bane of leftists everywhere) was consistent with its "soft on communism" foreign policy. Under withering attack on numerous issues, Acheson no longer believed that this particular fight was worth the effort.

In early January 1950, Acheson approached Truman with a proposed public statement that would clearly alter the American attitude toward Franco. The president said he would study it, and he inserted a few lines to express his opposition to the lack of religious freedom in Spain. Truman wanted to add a line saying that "Protestants and Jews . . . are not even allowed to hold public funeral services for their dead and are forced to bury their dead in what are virtually potters fields." Truman also asked his aide Clark Clifford to study the statement and offer his suggestions. Clifford offered strong support for the statement in general while attempting to temper Truman's fixation on the religious issue. He suggested that Truman's addition be excised and the words religious freedom added to a list of developments for which the United States hoped. Clifford also suggested the omission of two other sections, which he considered "gratuitous" insults to both the opposition and the Franco government. Not surprisingly, Truman agreed to omit the criticism of the opposition and insisted on including the offending passage about Franco.45

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alliance. Acheson calculated that if he could get Truman to agree to jettison the UN resolution, the most indefensible aspect of American policy, he could perhaps blunt the Spain lobby’s offensive and stop the effort to include Spain in the Marshall Plan and NATO.

In his remarks, Acheson unmistakably revealed his distinct lack of enthusiasm for Spain as an ally. It had long been the position of the department that the political and psychological damage of incorporating Spain into the defense of Western Europe would far outweigh any possible military gain. In May 1949, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee concluded that “military assistance to Spain would be readily construed as a design on the part of the United States Government to establish the real line of defense on the Pyrenees.” This was, in fact, what many military experts planned. The committee concluded, “The fear in Western Europe, particularly in France, that this may be the intention of the United States is real and any encouragement of it could have very serious consequences.”

When first asked about Spain, Acheson’s response was that the country was “not a critical or important factor.” Pressed further, the secretary offered the opinion that Spain was not “a great and valuable ally.” “Intimacy with Spain does not help you in the cold war,” Acheson argued; “it causes you great difficulty” due to the propaganda opportunities it provided for the communists. Acheson asserted that there was little military benefit to close relations with Spain:

If anyone believes that Franco will be a loyal and true ally, all he has to do is to study the situation in the last war. . . By making love to this fellow you are not going to get bases from this fellow any more than Hitler did.

Thus did Acheson hope to retreat from the administration’s current untenable position to a more defensible one of opposing economic and military ties to Spain.49

Later that month, Acheson finally obtained Truman’s approval to announce American support for the repeal of the UN resolution and issued a public statement to that effect in the form of a letter to Senator Connally. Acheson noted both the foreign and domestic policy reasons for the change: the failure of the UN resolution to bring about a change in government or even reform in Spain and “public bewilderment . . . over the inconsistency of accrediting ambassadors to such countries as those in Eastern Europe [while] refusing to appoint an ambassador to Spain.” He then announced that the United States would vote to repeal the resolution, emphasizing that this did not imply approval of the Franco regime. The remainder of the letter stressed that this step did not clear the way for the incorporation of Spain into the West, either economically or militarily. The foreign policy of the United States, Acheson wrote, “is not merely a negative reaction to Communism. It is, rather, a positive program to support and strengthen democratic freedoms.” Until Spain made substantial progress in this area, its participation “would weaken rather than strengthen the effort.” He ended the letter with a message to Franco: “the next steps . . . are up to the Spanish Government.”50

Although Acheson’s statement prompted some criticism, the lack of outrage from liberals showed how much the public temper had changed since the end of World War II. The Congress of Industrial Organizations, which had been among the most outspoken opponents of any rapprochement with Franco, assured the State Department that it would not cause much trouble and would limit itself to a “token protest.”51 Acheson’s attempt to form a core of centrist support for the new administration policy bore political fruit that spring when Senator McCarran resumed the push for the Spain lobby agenda in Congress. During Senate consideration of funding for the Marshall Plan for fiscal 1951, McCarran attempted to attach an amendment forbidding military aid to Spain. On the day the vote was scheduled, Truman and Acheson met with Senator Connally and told him that Spain could apply for an export-import loan instead. Connally then used this personal assurance to divert support from the amendment, which was defeated forty-two to thirty-five.

While Acheson saw this new approach as a tactical retreat that would enable Truman to maintain his strategic ground, the American military establishment saw in it a concession by the State Department and an opportunity to push for greater military cooperation with Spain. For more than two years, forces within the Defense Department had been arguing that the United States should obtain air and naval bases in Spain.52 With the administration in the midst of formulating National Security Council paper 68 (NSC 68), which proposed a dramatic militarization of U.S. containment policy, the time seemed right for an offensive on the Spanish front. On April 21, just two weeks after NSC 68 was presented to the president, a State Department official warned Acheson that the Defense Department believed that “the United States should be prepared to go further in proposing steps for insuring Spanish military cooperation.”53 On April 28, in a conversation with Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Acheson complained that Air Force Secretary Kenneth Royall “has been pressuring the Defense Establishment as he has been pressuring us” to sell planes and aircraft engines to Spain.54

In early May 1950, the joint chiefs of staff (JCS) made the strongest case yet for Spanish participation in Western defense. Directly contradicting Acheson’s earlier testimony to Congress, they argued that “insufficient weight has been given to the more important security and strategic interests of the United States in Spain.” Arguing that the relative weakness of NATO vis-à-vis the Soviet Union meant that the West might not be able to defend France and thus needed Spain as a fallback position, the JCS recommended that Spain “take action without delay to assure to the United States and its allies military accessibility to and military cooperation with Spain either bilaterally or through the acceptance of that nation as a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty.”55

Despite Acheson’s support for NSC 68, the State Department vehemently disagreed, arguing that the best policy was to “continue to lay emphasis on the political disadvantages of closer association with Spain.”56 Another reason for rejecting the JCS approach was the fact that Truman remained as adamant as ever that the United States keep Franco at a respectable distance. After reading the recommendation of the JCS, Truman sent a handwritten note to Acheson calling the proposed military ties “wrong as can be.”57 Later, he called the report “decidedly militaristic” and “not realistic with present conditions.”58

The key phrase here is “present conditions.” American reluctance to embrace Franco remained rooted in the idea that it would undermine the argument that U.S. policy was “based on the positive concept of strengthening and safeguarding Western democracy.” But the United States was willing to forget this consideration in the event of
“some radical change in the general situation such as ... the threat of imminent war.” As Harry Truman made his remarks on Spanish policy in mid-June 1950, no radical change or threat of war appeared on the horizon. But a little more than a week later, the North Korean Army poured into South Korea. What had seemed militaristic and unrealistic was about to be viewed as indispensable to the national security, and the “positive concept” behind American policy was transformed into an unaffordable luxury.

While the invasion of South Korea eventually helped to transform America’s Spanish policy, it produced no immediate effect. On July 7, 1950, Truman’s attitude had not yet altered at all. He told Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson that “it would take a lot of convincing to make him recognize Franco.”60 In the weeks after the outbreak of the war, Truman and the State Department continued to resist the urgings of the JCS for a military relationship with Spain. In contrast, the international situation had helped change the public’s view of Spain. An August 1950 Gallup poll indicated public support for economic and military aid to Spain by more than a two to one margin (58 percent to 23 percent), provided Spain agreed to fight the Soviet Union in the event of war.61

In the fall of 1950, events led Acheson to reconsider his position regarding a military relationship with Spain. His concerns about Western European perceptions were assuaged in September when the foreign ministers of Great Britain and France told him that there was “a good deal of pressure” in their respective national legislatures “to bring Franco into European defense plans.”62 By late November, it was apparent that the Chinese had entered the Korean war, adding to fears of a larger conflict. Regarding NSC 72, a reappraisal of policy toward Spain, State Department officials now argued, “Changing conditions resulting from Soviet-inspired aggression and consequent danger of global war, require a reconsideration ... which will serve the immediate requirements of our national security.”63 State now joined Defense in supporting the establishment of U.S. air and naval bases in Spain and envisioned the eventual participation of Spain in NATO.

The UN resolution had to be repealed before any military initiatives were possible, however. In November, at the initiative of several Latin American countries and with full backing from the U.S. delegation, the UN voted at last to lift the ban on ambassadors to Spain that had been in place since 1946. President Truman was still not fully on board. When asked if he had now decided to send an ambassador to Franco, Truman told the press that it would “be a long, long time before there is an ambassador in Spain” and gave a curt “no comment” when asked his opinion of the UN action that his own delegation supported.64 Again, Truman’s well-known proclivity for speaking his mind put him in conflict with his own administration. With its remarks, the president undermined what Acheson had been trying to do for months, that is, remove any political significance from the appointment of an ambassador to Madrid. Since January 1950, the State Department had been saying that the UN resolution was the only impediment to full diplomatic relations and that recognition implied no endorsement of the regime.

The secretary moved to contain the damage. On November 13, Acheson met with Truman and made the case for the appointment of an ambassador, noting that, as one of his aides had written, “our failure to act once this ban has been lifted will cause the U.S. considerable embarrassment” and would have the effect of investing the repeal of the UN resolution with political meaning, precisely what the State Department had been trying to avoid out of deference to Truman’s feelings.65 At this point Acheson only succeeded in getting Truman to agree to “consider this matter carefully” and talk about it again.66 Acheson must have been confident of his ability to convince his chief, however. He had already settled on a nominee, Stanton Griffis, who had resigned as ambassador to Argentina only three days before, and was scheduled to meet with Truman on November 17. On November 16, Acheson again discussed the question with the president and obtained his acquiescence in the appointment only two weeks after Truman had said that it would be “a long, long time” before he sent an ambassador to Spain.

Truman now had to find a tactful way to retreat. On the same day that he agreed to the Griffis nomination, Truman faced reporters who asked if he had changed his mind about an ambassador for Spain. Truman softened his position, saying now that he was “reluctant” but “could be convinced that it is necessary.” However, he added, he was “not in that frame of mind now.”67 Four days later, when Griffis formally accepted the appointment, Truman gave the State Department permission to inform American allies that the decision had been made. When Griffis requested a vacation before beginning his new duties, Truman was thrilled: “That’s great and exactly what I want,” he said. “I don’t want you to go for the present—so soon after what I said a few weeks ago.” Thus, the president was able to save face somewhat by delaying the announcement of the appointment until December 27.68 The White House press corps generously spared Truman and declined to ask if seven weeks was “a long, long time.”

This fiasco was typical of Truman’s relationship with the rest of his administration on Spain. When faced with the practical and persuasive arguments of Acheson that the resolution was a failure and had become an embarrassment and that the dangerous world situation required the U.S. to seek bases in Spain, Truman eventually relented. Nonetheless, he was unable to resist the impulse to express his feelings publicly when asked about the prospect of a closer relationship with Franco. This was not the last time Truman would try to put the brakes on the process, but he now realized that his entire administration was aligned against him on the issue. He was, Truman told Griffis, “a little overruled and worn down by the Department.”69

But it was not only the State Department that had done the job, and Harry Truman did not go down without a fight. The work of the Spain lobby had finally borne fruit. Its campaign to repeal the UN resolution succeeded in making Franco more acceptable to the American public. Its strength in Congress made the lobby a political force that the administration could not ignore, complicating efforts to implement the Marshall Plan and NATO. Representative O’Konski and Senator McCarran habitually harangued the administration, proposing popular amendments to provide economic aid to Spain against the wishes of the administration, and cited administration hostility toward Franco as evidence that it was infested with communists. The lobby’s supporters in the Defense Department made the argument that Spain was essential to the security of the West. These factors combined with the growing sense, embodied in NSC 68, that the American position in the cold war was deteriorating: “the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. ... Risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice.”70 The Soviet atomic test and Mao’s triumph in China gave rise to these fears, and the Korean War seemed to confirm them. The case for Spain became irresistible. No regime willing to help in this struggle could be held forever at arm’s length in such a crisis.
In the face of this overwhelming opposition, Harry Truman bowed to the pressure, surrendered his strongly held principles, and finally sent an ambassador to Spain. Over the next three years, the Spain lobby's full agenda would become a reality: the U.S. would extend first economic and eventually military aid to Franco Spain, culminating with the Pact of Madrid in September 1953, which established American air and naval bases in Spain.

All of this came despite the continuing reservations of the president. It was no doubt of some comfort to Truman (and not a coincidence) that at least the actual agreement with Franco was not signed on his watch, although most of the important negotiations were conducted before he left office. When faced with the unremitting campaign not only in Congress but within his own administration, and the arguments not only of his political enemies but those of his most trusted diplomatic and military advisers, Truman succumbed to political pressure and altered the direction of American policy toward Spain. His views nonetheless did make a short-term difference and delayed for years closer diplomatic, economic, and military ties with Spain. Ultimately, however, it was a question of "when" and not "if." In this case, the power of the president was merely the ability to delay, not prevent, the adoption of a policy.

Truman never reconciled himself to these developments or his role in them. On the eve of the start of formal negotiations on a military pact with Spain in July 1951, Truman wrote Admiral Forrest Sherman, "I don't like Franco and I never will, but I won't let my personal feelings override the convictions of your military men." Still, only weeks later, after receiving a letter from a fellow Mason describing the treatment of Masons and Protestants in Spain, Truman dashed off an angry memo to Acheson: "I have never been happy about sending an ambassador to Spain, and I am not happy about it now," Truman wrote, "and unless Franco changes in his treatment of citizens who don't agree with him religiously I'll be sorely tempted to break off all communication with him in spite of the defense of Europe." After being reassured by Acheson and Griffis of progress in this area, Truman relented, but the outburst shows his continuing unease with his policy toward Spain.

Truman dealt with this discomfort by distancing himself from the policy. When asked in early 1951 whether the administration was considering Spanish membership in NATO (which Defense had long urged and State had recently accepted as a long-term goal), Truman responded, "It has not been under consideration. At least, not by me." Years later, in a private letter to Acheson, he criticized the Eisenhower-Dulles policy toward Spain: "There's some fee for somebody when he deals with that lousy totalitarian Franco," Truman wrote, ignoring the fact that, albeit against his wishes, he too dealt with "that lousy totalitarian."  

Notes


6. Acheson to Truman, December 22, 1950, OF 422, Truman Papers, HSTL. For example, Lequerica used his contacts with Myron C. Taylor, the president's personal representative to the Vatican, to encourage Truman to replace the American chargé d'affaires in Madrid with someone more friendly to the regime. See Lequerica to Taylor, November 19, 1948, and Taylor to Truman, November 29, 1948, Papers of Myron C. Taylor, Box 1, HSTL.

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7. After the 1948 presidential election, a Spanish newspaper published an interview with Barkley, conducted September 3, in which the vice president elect said that "relations between Spain and the United States would be better in the future." New York Times, November 9, 1948.
9. For example, one cotton executive wrote the State Department, "I just want to keep you reminded that, when the moment comes for a freer hand with Spain, we will be ready to help with her cotton supplies." Lamar Fleming of Anderson, Clayton & Co. to Hickerson, March 17, 1948, National Archives Record Group (hereafter NARG) 59 852.0003-1748, Box 6314. Clayton was Will Clayton, assistant secretary of state for economic affairs.
10. On loans, see, for example, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) III, 1948, 1039-1040. On bases, see, for example, FRUS III, 1948, 1034-1035.
11. Transcript of a speech by Franco, April, 1950, Papers of Myron C. Taylor, Box 1, HSTL.
14. Neuwirth, October 10, 1948. Senator Gurney echoed Farley's call for a military alliance with Spain and expressed the hope that a Dewey administration would be closer to Spain. On that same day, Gurney made this proposal to the top military officials of the Truman administration, including Defense Secretary James Forrestal, Army Secretary Kenneth Royall, Navy Secretary John Sullivan, and Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington. New York Times, October 7, 1948. Meanwhile, in Madrid, Franco held lengthy meetings with Farley.
17. One report said that the Spanish "hope . . . that as soon as Dewey crosses the threshold of the White House he will send James Farley to Spain as ambassador and begin a new era of Spanish-American relations." Neuwirth, November 8, 1948, p. 34. Although we cannot know for certain what Dewey's policy would have been, it is likely that he would have been much more receptive to the entreaties of the Spain lobby than Truman, who was the main obstacle to improved relations. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Dewey gave a foreign policy speech urging closer ties to Spain.
18. Colburtson to State, October 19, 1948, NARG 59, 711.52/10-1948.
20. Apolitical spring, the dispute spread to the State Department itself, with an internal dispute over whether Spain should be eligible for export-import loans.
23. Representatives from Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Mississippi all called for full diplomatic relations and cotton credits for Franco. The New Republic reported that a "pro-Franco lobby is now concentrating on Congress [and] is having an effect. See New Republic, May 30, 1949, p. 7.
25. Ibid., p. 5967. McCarran did not, however, specifically "exonerate" Truman.
26. Ibid., p. 5969. Acheson called the suggestion that American policy was influenced by religious bias "poppycock."
Democratic Action learned of the meeting and protested the "secret session" with a Spanish banker to work out a loan to finance cotton exports to Spain. See New York Times, May 13, 1949.


32. Ibid., p. 813.
34. See, for example, Herbert Feis, The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at War (New York: Knopf, 1948).
38. PPS/12-"U.S. Policy Toward Spain"—later NSC 3, October 24, 1947, FRUS 1947, III: 1094.
41. Memo of Conversation, Acheson and Truman, November 21, 1949, Acheson Papers, Secretary of State 1949-53, Memoranda of Conversation 1949, Box 64, HSTL.
42. Memo of Conversation, Acheson and Truman, December 20, 1949, Acheson Papers, Secretary of State 1949-53 Memoranda of Conversation 1949, Box 64, HSTL.
44. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 169.
45. Clifford to Truman, January 9, 1950, Files of Clark Clifford, Box 6, Foreign Affairs File, HSTL. Truman's handwritten additions are on "Statement by the Secretary of State on Spain," White House Central Files, Box 41, Correspondence 1950, Truman Papers, HSTL.
47. Ibid., p. 125.
50. Acheson to Connally, January 18, 1950, FRUS 1950, III: 1549-1554. While the Americans for Democratic Action denounced the "appeasement of Franco," he hastened to add that this was an aberration and was not consistent "with our generally sound foreign policy." Acheson, in a meeting with Truman, called the reaction to his letter "excellent" and predicted that it would "have the effect of getting the sound people on our side although it would not please the extremists at either end." Memo of Conversation, Acheson and Truman, January 19, 1950, HSTL, Acheson Papers, Secretary of State 1949-53, Memoranda of Conversation 1950, Box 65.
51. Tobin to Dunham, January 18, 1950, NARG 59, 611:52/1-1850.
53. Thompson to Acheson, April 21, 1950, FRUS 1950, III: 1588.
54. Memo of Conversation, Acheson and Johnson, April 28, 1950, Acheson Papers, Secretary of State 1949-53, Memoranda of Conversation 1950, Box 65, HSTL.
57. Truman to Acheson, June 8, 1950, PSF, NSC Meetings, Box 208, Meeting 60, Truman Papers, HSTL.
60. Memo of Conversation, July 7, 1950, PSF, NSC Meeting 60, Box 208, Truman Papers, HSTL.
61. Gallup poll, August 4, 1950, The Gallup Poll, pp. 937-38. The poll also found support for Spain in NATO, 48 percent to 22 percent.
64. Truman press conference, November 2, 1950, Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 697.
69. Griffin, Lying in State, p. 269.
72. Truman to Acheson, August 2, 1951, PSF, File Spain, Box 188, Truman Papers, HSTL.
73. Truman press conference, January 4, 1951, Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 3.
74. Truman to Acheson, November 11, 1955, Papers of Dean Acheson, Acheson-Truman correspondence, 1947-1971, Box 166, HSTL.